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CORPORATE PATENTS: OPTIMIZING
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO
INNOVATION OPPORTUNITIES AND
INVENTION DISCOVERIES
RICHARD S. GRUNER∗
1

2

Corporate patents —that is, utility patents
owned by
3
corporations —are critically important, yet poorly understood creatures
* Richard S. Gruner is a registered patent attorney and a former inside counsel for the IBM
Corporation. He is presently a Professor of Law at the Whittier Law School. Professor
Gruner is a member of the New York and California state bars and a graduate of the
Columbia University School of Law (LL.M. 1982), the University of Southern California Law
School (J.D. 1978), and California Institute of Technology (B.S. 1975). He is the co-author,
with Shubha Ghosh and Jay Kesan, of INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (forthcoming 2006).
1. Patent owners can prevent others from making, using, or selling a patented
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). Generally, corporations can realize the commercial
value of these patents by using or selling the patented items or services themselves or by
permitting (i.e. “licensing”) others to use or sell the patented items or services in exchange for
royalty payments. Companies that choose to use or sell patented inventions themselves
realize the value of the associated patents by setting the prices for their products or services
at elevated levels that reflect the fact that the corporations are the sole legitimate sources or
users of the patented inventions. Companies that choose to license their patented inventions
to others realize the value of their patents through the licensees’ royalty payments. Which of
these means is the best for a patent holder to maximize patent value depends largely on
whether the patent holder or licensee is the most efficient and effective in delivering products
and services based on a patented invention to consumers.
2. Utility patents are the primary variety of patents issued under U.S. law. They
control the making, using, and selling of useful devices, materials, and processes. Id. §§ 101,
154. Utility patents should be distinguished from two much less common types of patents:
design patents (which control ornamental designs for useful products) and plant patents
(which control new varieties of asexually reproducing plants). See id. §§ 171, 161.
3. The focus of the Article is on business corporations that seek and utilize patents.
Most U.S. utility patents are owned by corporations. See infra Part I.A. However, some such
patents are doubtless owned by partnerships and other collectively owned business entities.
In addition, non-profit organizations, such as universities, comprise a small component of
organizational patent owners. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969–2000,
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of intellectual property law. Under U.S. law, corporations are not
proper patent applicants because corporations do not discover
4
inventions, individuals do. Despite this, corporations are frequently
assigned patent rights from individual inventors, often before the
5
patents involved have even issued. As a consequence, corporations
6
own and control most patents. Corporations use patents to structure
7
and facilitate a wide variety of valuable transactions and activities.
This Article argues that innovation concerning today’s complex
technologies often requires corporate efforts and that changes in patent
and corporate laws are needed to fully promote effective and efficient
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgn/table_1.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2002) [hereinafter U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS] (placing
university ownership for new patents issued in 2000 at 2% of all utility patents). To the
extent that these non-corporate entities share the business objectives or organizational modes
of action exhibited by business corporations, these other types of patent-owning entities
should be governed by the considerations discussed here.
4. Only an individual inventor or group of individual inventors can apply for a utility
patent under U.S. law. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), 116 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(a) (2004). The
failure of the actual inventor of a device or process to apply for a related patent will prevent
the procurement of patent protection in most instances. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000)
(providing that a person shall not be entitled to a patent if “he did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented”); Lorenz v. Berkline Corp., 215 F. Supp. 869, 880 (N.D.
Ill. 1963) (“A patent applied for by one who is not the inventor is unauthorized by law and
void, whether taken out in the name of the applicant or of any assignee of his; it confers no
right as against the public.”).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). Corporations may obtain assignments of patent rights
even before a patent issues through two mechanisms. First, an inventor who has applied for a
patent may be an employee of a corporation and have a pre-existing obligation under her
terms of employment to assign any patent rights resulting from her employment to her
corporate employer. Second, the inventor may have acted as an independent individual in
making the invention covered by a patent, but have arranged during the often long pendency
of the patent application (on average, approximately three years) to assign the inventor’s
patent rights to a corporation in exchange for compensation. In either of these types of
circumstances, the relevant patent will be issued in the corporation’s name with a notation
reflecting the identity of the inventor that was the original patent applicant.
Corporations may also obtain ownership of patent rights after a patent has issued by
obtaining an assignment from the initial patent holder or by acquiring (through mergers or
other means) corporations or other legal entities that were themselves patent owners.
Indeed, when large corporations acquire start-up companies that have discovered and
developed a valuable new technology or product design, the patent rights of the start-up
companies and the exclusive commercialization opportunities those rights imply are often
among the most attractive features of the start-ups to the acquiring companies.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. Intellectual property interests such as patents are so central to aiding modern
corporate activities that, for many businesses, “[c]orporate value hinges not on the operation
of production assets, but on the optimal financial exploitation of intellectual property.”
GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LICENSING AND
JOINT VENTURE PROFIT STRATEGIES xiii (1993).
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innovation in corporate environments. The prevalence of patent
ownership and exploitation by corporations reflect a fundamental but
ill-appreciated truth about modern technological innovation. Patent
incentives encouraging innovation by individuals do not bring most new
inventions to the public. Rather, in many technological areas, corporate
actions are the primary sources of innovation, hence, the main targets of
patent incentives. Corporate financing and operations encouraged by
patents are frequently required to gather and apply the personnel,
resources, and marketing skills needed for developing, manufacturing,
selling, and delivering highly complex, new products based on patented
designs.
The discovery, perfection, and delivery to the public of new
innovations through corporate processes require the initiation and
funding of corresponding corporate enterprises. Both patent and
corporate laws can further these corporate processes if such laws are
tailored to promote the efficient formation and operation of corporate
organizations focused on innovative activities. Changes in patent law
standards may influence the perceived value of innovations in corporate
8
settings, while changes in corporate laws may affect how funding is
sought for corporate efforts to develop patented inventions and how
patented innovations are transformed into useful, widely distributed
9
products. An effective interplay between patent and corporate laws is
needed to fully support and encourage corporate processes aimed at
innovation. Legal reforms should recognize the critical and potentially
synergistic relationship between patent and corporate laws as
complementary means to promote corporate innovation.
This Article examines the often neglected linkage between patent
and corporate laws and the roles that patents serve in promoting the
10
discovery and commercialization of innovations by corporations. The
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. The analysis presented here both extends and complements the work of Professor
F. Scott Kieff. Professor Kieff has emphasized the importance of patent laws in encouraging
the commercialization of new technologies and the realization of associated societal benefits.
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001). He has argued that the primary justification for patent rights lies
in the incentives that patents provide for the commercialization of inventions. Professor
Kieff concludes that exclusive patent rights are needed to ensure that fears of free riders do
not cause the commercialization of new, nonobvious technologies to be underemphasized,
resulting in the distribution of related products and services to the public at sub-optimal
levels. See id. at 732–36. The analysis presented here recognizes that the commercialization
of products and services based on new technologies is strongly promoted by patent incentives,
but it views the initiation and funding of corporate efforts to be the primary vehicle for this
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roles of patents in aiding the activities of corporate innovators define
the distinctive functions of corporate patents.
The impacts of patents in the founding, growth, and maturation of
corporations have been largely ignored by persons examining the
11
Yet, because corporations
significance and value of patent rights.
comprise such a large component of patent holders, the effects of patent
rights on corporations are important consequences of the patent system
that deserve further study. Likewise, corporate processes leading to
patentable inventions and transforming such inventions into publicly
available products are of major consequence for the patent system.
Given that the ultimate end of patent law is to make products based on
12
new technologies available to the public at the lowest net cost possible,
patent law goals are promoted by corporate processes that effectively
and efficiently pursue technological innovation, product perfection, and
the initial marketing of new products to the public.
In short, the satisfaction of patent law goals depends on features of
both patent and corporate laws that support innovation and related
product perfection and popularization processes. By treating patent and
corporate law doctrines as complementary parts of the legal
underpinnings encouraging organizational development of new
commercialization. Hence, the particular impact of patent laws on these corporate processes
becomes a primary patent law focus. In addition to extending Professor Kieff’s work in this
respect, the present Article views corporate innovation as a joint product of structures and
incentives created by the interplay of patent and corporate laws, suggesting that careful
attention to how each of these types of law bear upon corporate innovation processes may
have a valuable impact on public access to new technologies.
11. The reasons for this neglect are unclear. One possible source is the limited
expertise of the specialists whose attention is needed to explore the interplay between patent
and corporate laws. Patent law specialists tend not to be versed in the corporate laws
governing how patents are used in corporation settings. Similarly, corporate and securities
law specialists tend not to have strong backgrounds in patent law and, as a consequence, may
overlook legal issues in the funding and operation of corporations that stem from the unusual
features of patents as corporate property.
Another possible reason for the neglect of the interplay of patent and corporate laws
may be that patents, unlike many other forms of property owned by corporations, may not
have a clearly ascertainable liquidation value for which they could be sold immediately.
Rather, the value of a patent is peculiarly tied to how the related patented technology is
implemented in commercially successful products and services. This means that patent value
is often tied to the success of subsequent commercializing activities by corporate owners,
thereby making patent value and corporate operating success unusually intertwined
considerations.
12. By minimizing the costs of producing and popularizing new inventions, an efficient
version of patent law would maximize the net societal gains from each invention. See, e.g.,
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
316–18 (1992).
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technologies and related products, changes in both patent and corporate
laws promoting better innovative processes may be revealed.
For example, the distinctive benefits of patents in supporting
corporate research and product development may justify extending
patent rights to different types of subject matters and infringing
activities than would be the case if patents were tailored just to
13
encourage the efforts of individual innovators.
An organizationoriented body of patent law may be significantly different than an
14
individual-oriented one.
Similarly, corporate laws might be reshaped to better encourage
modes of corporate formation, financing, operation, and ownership
transfer that will support socially valuable innovation and product
propagation efforts by corporations.
This Article identifies the distinctive public benefits of patent rights
in corporate contexts by viewing those rights from corporate
perspectives. It assesses the impacts of patent rights on several types of
innovative activities typically undertaken through group processes and
collective resources assembled and applied by corporations. The Article
also considers how patents promote these sorts of group activities and
applications of superhuman resources by corporations, focusing on
types of patent impacts that are different from the influence of patents
on individuals.
Shifting from a descriptive to a normative focus, the Article provides
some examples of the types of patent and corporate law doctrines that
might be adjusted to better promote optimal innovation and product
introduction efforts by corporations. It argues that such adjustments
can enhance the role of patent rights in promoting the success,
effectiveness, and efficiency of companies that are technological
innovators. These benefits can be achieved by increasing the value and
incentive effects of patents themselves and by expanding the impact of
patents on innovation-enhancing conduct such as public investment in
corporate innovators.
These changes will promote the ultimate aim of the patent system to
enhance technological innovations available to the public. The public
benefits resulting from an innovation generally do not depend on
13. See infra Part IV.A.4–5.
14. Because the public’s primary interest in recognizing patents and related constraints
on patented inventions is in gaining access to greater numbers of useful inventions through
efficient development processes, a shift to a more organization-centered patent law will serve
the public interest to the extent that the shift produces more patentable inventions or reduces
the net development cost of particular inventions.
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whether the innovation occurs through corporate or individual
activities. Hence, increases in the number of innovations realized by
corporations or decreases in the net costs of discovering innovations and
bringing related products to public availability are clearly in the public
interest. To the extent that they alter the number or cost of useful
products in these ways, changes in the scope of patent rights and the
ways those rights are used in corporate activities supporting innovation
will be important advances in the patent system.
I.

CORPORATE DOMINANCE OF PATENT OWNERSHIP AND
ENFORCEMENT

Utility patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) in recent years reflect a striking picture of corporate
15
ownership and control of patent interests. Corporate ownership of
patents has remained at 80% or greater of all utility patents since 1991
16
and, in recent years, has risen to almost 90%. In some technological
fields, corporations are almost the sole type of patent recipient, thereby
reflecting the need for large-scale, corporate-financed resources to

15. Corporate ownership of utility patents is profiled in a number of statistical reports
prepared by the USPTO. These include the following:
(1) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, JANUARY 1, 1963–DECEMBER 31, 2001 (2002),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/all_tech.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT] (describing percentages of corporate patent
ownership).
(2) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TOP TEN PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#top_org
(last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (containing single year reports for 1991 through 2001).
(3) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS
REPORT, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#TO (last visited
Oct. 2, 2002) (containing single year reports providing an extended list of prolific
patenting organizations receiving patents for 1995 through 2001).
(4) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS
1969–2000, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm
(last visited Dec. 16, 2002) (analyzing university-owned patents in comparison with all
patents and all corporate patents).
(5) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PATENTING BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/classes.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2002) (analyzing utility patents granted to organizations in the five year period from 1997
through 2001 with separate analyses for each primary patent classification class).
16. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-2; see also infra Part I.A–B.
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participate as an effective innovator. In such settings, innovation is
truly a corporate process; thus, patents, if they are to have any
meaningful impact, must advance the useful arts through corporate
incentives and corporate responses.
This section examines current levels of corporate patent ownership,
the evolution of that ownership in recent years, the concentration of
patent ownership among a few large corporations, and the disparate
patterns of corporate patent ownership in different technology domains.
A. Corporate Domination of Patent Ownership
In 2000, corporations—both domestic and foreign—received 87% of
18
all utility patents. Of this percentage, 45% were received by U.S.
19
corporations and 42% were received by foreign corporations.
20
Individual owners accounted for only 13% of all new patents.
The USPTO treats university-owned patents as a form of corporateowned patents.
Hence, these corporate patent figures include
university-owned patents. However, in recent years, such universityowned patents have accounted for only 2% of all utility patents and
21
4.5% of all corporate owned patents. If university-owned patents are
omitted, business corporations accounted for 85% of all utility patents
in 2001. Given the small fraction of the total utility patent figures
corresponding to non-business organizations such as universities,
corporate patents will be assumed to be owned by business corporations
in the remainder of this Article.
B. Historical Patterns of Corporate Patent Ownership
The high degree of corporate patent ownership just described is not
a recent phenomenon. Although there has been a rise in corporate
ownership over this period, high percentages of corporate patent
ownership have prevailed for at least the last decade. The fractions of
corporate utility patent ownership over this period have been as
22
follows:

17. See infra Part I.D.
18. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. University-owned patents constituted 4.4% of all corporate owned patents in 2000
and have hovered between 3.4% and 4.9% since 1991. U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—
UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, supra note 3.
22. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1, A1-2.
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Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Total Corporate
Domestic
Patents
Owned
Corporations
96,513
80%
41%
97,444
80%
41%
98,342
82%
43%
101,676
81%
43%
101,419
81%
43%
109,645
82%
44%
111,983
83%
45%
147,521
84%
45%
153,485
84%
45%
157,495
85%
45%
166,039
87%
45%

Foreign
Corporations
39%
39%
39%
38%
38%
38%
38%
39%
39%
40%
42%

Clearly, there has been a slow but steady increase in the fractional
level of corporate ownership, initially involving increases only in
domestic corporate ownership but most recently reflecting a gain by
23
foreign corporations as well.
While these percentage figures are important means to study the
composition of patent ownership and the growing control of
corporations over patents and patented inventions, such percentages
mask to some degree the enormous magnitude of patents under
corporate control at the end of this period in comparison with corporate
patent ownership levels at the beginning of the period. Focusing on just
the changes between 1991 and 2001, the actual numbers of patents
24
under corporate control changed as follows:
Year
1991

Total
Patents
6,513

Corporate
Owned
76,727

Domestic
Corporations
39,133

Foreign
Corporations
37,594

2001

166,039

143,269

74,327

68,942

Change

+72%

+87%

+90%

+83%

23. This growth in the fraction of utility patents owned by corporations seems to have
extended back before the eleven years described here. Over the period of 1963 to 1987,
corporations accounted for 76% of all utility patents, compared with 80% in 1991 and 87% in
2001. Id. at A1-2.
24. Id.
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It is difficult to know with certainty the source of these major leaps in
patent numbers, but several potential explanations are plausible.
First, this increase in patent totals, particularly in corporate patent
totals, may reflect an increased confidence in patents generally as
25
sources of intellectual property protections.
Such an increase in
confidence may be a consequence of changes in patent laws and altered
perceptions of patents by both legal and business specialists. The
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases, and the resulting development
of a unified, relatively predictable body of case law regarding the scope
and strength of patent rights may have reassured technology innovators
about the probable extent of patent rights for particular innovations and
26
thereby caused more innovators to seek patents. Confidence that the
resulting patent rights would have an enforceable impact over a
predictable range of commercial activities may have caused more
inventors—or the corporations backing those inventors—to pay the
price—in both patent prosecution dollars and disclosures to
competitors—associated with patent applications. Under this analysis,
the increased number of patents seen in recent years is a descriptive, but
non-technological phenomenon. That is, the increase may not reflect
more inventions, just more patents concerning the type and number of
inventions that were already being produced. This type of increase in
patents produces a corresponding gain in the description of new
technologies through more numerous patent disclosures.
A second explanation may be that there really has been an increase
in innovation in this period, at least in the significantly new areas that
are likely to lead to patentable inventions. Certainly a number of
fields—from biotechnology to telecommunications electronics to
information processing—have experienced breakthroughs in this period,

25. See, e.g., George M. Sirilla et al., The Advice of Counsel Defense to Increased Patent
Damages, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 705, 705 (1992) (“Since the creation of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in October 1982, the apparent value
of U.S. patents has increased dramatically.”); Robert P. Taylor, Twenty Years of the Federal
Circuit: An Overview, in 1 PLI’S EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 9, 12 (David Bender & Robert P. Taylor co-chairs, 2002) (concluding that
the net effect of the Federal Circuit’s effort to clarify patent law is “readily apparent in the
significantly greater value that patents enjoy today”).
26. See, e.g., KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:
UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 43–44 (2000) (describing the increased use of
patents to protect new technologies and creation of business assets following the clarification
of patent law by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the associated rise in the
perceived value of patents among business leaders).
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leading to streams of patentable innovations. Furthermore, advances in
computers and the resulting use of computer-based information
processing methods as broadly applicable analytic tools have caused reevaluations and redesigns of devices and processes in a wide range of
fields, in some cases producing new computer-based or computerassisted designs that are significant enough departures from prior
versions to qualify for patents. This may simply be a boom time in
technological innovation, resulting in a corresponding growth in
corporate patents.
However, a third, business-related explanation may account for
much of the increase in corporate patents seen in the patent data.
Innovators or their business backers may be obtaining larger numbers of
patents because patents are increasingly being seen as critical
commercialization tools for new innovations. As the risk and cost of
developing new technologies grows, the risk containment and
investment attraction attainable through patent rights may seem
increasingly desirable.
Patent-based business models may seem
increasingly critical as innovators or their business associates look ahead
not only to the full course of efforts needed to pursue engineering
discoveries that may support new products, but also to the broader set
of activities needed to transform raw engineering discoveries into
marketable product designs, to establish manufacturing programs for
these products, and to gain public acceptance of the products through
27
initial marketing campaigns.
The great expense that is often entailed in pursuing the full course of
27. A number of expensive activities may be needed to bring a raw technological
advance from the point of partial appreciation of its potential utility sufficient to gain a patent
to the later stage of widespread delivery to the public of useful, commercially successful
products based on the technology. Critical post-invention steps in the commercialization of
products based on a new technology can include the following:
(1) Linking a technological discovery to a worthwhile marketing opportunity;
(2) Having the new technology endorsed by parties whose opinions matter;
(3) Incubating the technology to determine its full potential and cost-effectiveness;
(4) Mobilizing adequate resources for demonstration of the technology;
(5) Successfully demonstrating the technology in the context where it will be used;
(6) Mobilizing market constituents needed to popularize the technology and to deliver its
benefits;
(7) Promoting final products and services to skeptical customers;
(8) Choosing an appropriate business formula to access the relevant business context;
and
(9) Sustaining commercialization after product launch.
VIJAY K. JOLLY, COMMERCIALIZING NEW TECHNOLOGIES: GETTING FROM MIND TO
MARKET 2–3 (1997).
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these post-invention efforts, coupled with the need to generate
extensive investor support to cover these expenses, may be causing
inventors and entrepreneurs to focus increasingly on patents as
28
necessary elements of viable development strategies for new products.
Absent patents, innovators can only seek investment backing for new
products based on the inventors’ personal skills in commercializing an
innovation before competitors do and the tenuous intellectual property
protections afforded by trade secret laws. With one or more patents
covering a key bit of technology, innovators can promise investors a
stake in a particular, exclusive marketing opportunity as bounded by the
technology controlled by the patent rights and the patent holder’s ability
to exclude others from this opportunity through the exercise of those
rights. Particularly in resource intensive fields, a start-up enterprise
needs patent rights to even catch the preliminary attention of potential
investors, most of whom have many investment alternatives to choose
from and who see the risk containment characteristics of patent rights as
29
a minimum threshold feature of an investment worth considering. In
28. The encouragement of these types of post-invention commercialization activities
was a primary goal of the drafters of our present Patent Act. See generally Kieff, supra note
10, at 736–46. According to Giles Rich, a central drafter of the Patent Act and later a major
figure in shaping patent law as a federal appellate judge, the primary justification for patent
rights as granted under the Act lay not in the encouragement of invention or disclosure of
new technologies. Rather, a third type of inducement via patent rights was key:
The third aspect of inducement is by far the greatest in practical importance. It
applies to the inventor but not solely to him, unless he is his own capitalist. . . . It
might be called the inducement to risk an attempt to commercialize the invention.
It is the “business” aspect of the matter which is responsible for the actual delivery
of the invention into the hands of the public.
Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, Part II, 24
J. PAT. OFF. & TRADEMARK SOC’Y 159, 177 (1942).
29. Investment capital investors are frequently deluged with requests for funding and
will typically use the strength of intellectual property interests as one of several preliminary
screening criteria for winnowing down pools of possible companies for investment. A typical,
experienced investment capital investor may receive one thousand funding proposals a year,
of which only one hundred receive more than a cursory review and about five will receive
investment backing. In making the threshold choice of which companies to scrutinize in
detail, the present or projected patent portfolios or other intellectual property interests of
various companies seeking investment provide relatively easily assessed indicators of
investment value. Absent strong intellectual property protections that appear likely to ensure
some market exclusivity and associated profit potential in light of a company’s business plans,
a company will typically not attract sufficient attention to gain full scrutiny of other, more
complex business characteristics such as the strengths of the company’s management team
and products and how these relate to the comparable qualities of competitors. In short,
patents and other risk-reducing intellectual property interests serve as threshold indicators of
potential business success because these interests are relatively easily assessed at early stages
of business investment evaluations. See James. E. Malackowski & David I. Wakefield,
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short, patents may have become the entry ticket into the venture capital
derby, an essential business model feature of the viable start-up
30
Whatever their incentives for increased technology
company.
development, patents may be being sought in larger and larger numbers
as part of corporate business development strategies, primarily because
the ownership of patents serves to attract the investment needed for
commercialization of high-tech products.
C. Concentration of Corporate Patent Ownership
Within the group of corporations receiving utility patents in 2001,
patent ownership was highly concentrated in the hands of a few largescale corporate owners. Of the 143,269 patents received by corporate
owners in 2001, the ten corporations with the largest patent numbers
31
received 16,758 of those patents, approximately 12% of the total.
These ten corporations controlled a substantial fraction of the total
range of new devices and processes emerging from the patent system in
this year.
This degree of concentration in corporate patent ownership,
however, was not limited to the top ten corporations. Looking at a
broader set of corporations, the top one hundred corporate patent
recipients accounted for 51,833 patents, 31.2% of all new utility patents
32
in 2001. A further breakdown of corporate patents issued in 2001
Venture Investment Grounded in Intellectual Capital, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING
WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 157, 162–65 (Bruce Berman ed., 2002).
30. Even after a promising technology is discovered, the smooth and successful
commercialization of the technology often depends on further resource allocations in order to
bring products incorporating the technology to the public. Both technical promise and
further enthusiasm by those with necessary resources are needed to avoid having the progress
of new technologies stalled on the path towards useful products. In order to bring products
successfully to the public, commercialization frequently depends on successfully managing
two things: “creating enough value in a predecessor stage to make a technology worth taking
further, and mobilizing stakeholders concerned with the next stage and convincing them of its
future potential.” JOLLY, supra note 27, at 13. Patent rights and the promise of exclusive
marketing opportunities for patented products are part of the means that patent law provides
to mobilize business executives and investors to back the product design, manufacturing, and
marketing efforts needed to actually deliver patented products and the benefits of a new
technology to the public.
31. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1;
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 2001 (2002),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top01cos.htm [hereinafter TOP TEN
PATENTING ORGANIZATIONS 2001].
32. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
ORGANIZATIONS 2001 (2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_01.pdf
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shows the following percentages of patents issued to the indicated
33
groups of corporate patent recipients:
Ranking
1–10

Percentage of
Total
10.1%

Range of
Patents
3411 to 1166

Average Patents for
Ranking Group
1676 per corporation

11–100
101–436
437–26,693

21.0%
15.1%
40.7%

1149 to 168
167 to 40
39 to 1

388 per corporation
75 per corporation
2.6 per corporation

While these ranking categories have somewhat arbitrary boundaries,
they serve to illustrate the overall pattern of concentration in corporate
patent ownership. A few corporations at the very top of the patent
ownership list control a very high percentage of patents per corporation.
The largest single corporate patent recipient, the IBM Corporation,
34
accounted for 2% of all utility patents by itself.
A first tier of companies, corresponding to the top ten companies,
35
received more than a thousand patents per company in 2001 alone.
The intellectual property assets accumulated by each of these
companies in this one year reflect a broad set of controls over numerous
inventions.
The scope of technology controls gained by these
companies in this one year is even more significant than the number of
patents suggests because the control associated with these patents will
sweep into the future over the life of the patents each company
received.
A second tier of companies, corresponding to the next ninety
companies in the patent recipient rankings, accounted for another 21%
36
of patents. These companies each received numbers of patents in the
hundreds in 2001 and, thus, were also positioned to maintain control
over a substantial number of technological advances in their fields,
[hereinafter PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS 2001].
33. See id. The average patent numbers in the last column were obtained by taking the
total number of patents obtained by corporations in the indicated ranking group and dividing
by the number of corporations included in the ranking group. For example, the total number
of patents obtained for the corporations ranked one through ten in receipt of patents was
16,758 patents, producing an average of 16,758/10 or 1676 for each corporation in this ranking
group.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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although not nearly as many developments as the top ten companies.
A third tier of companies, corresponding to the remainder of the
corporations for which the USPTO tracked and reported company37
specific patent totals, received between 40 and 167 patents. Even the
smallest of these patent totals, if obtained regularly by a corporation,
would probably be sufficient to maintain control over future products in
a particular market segment or sub-domain of a commercial field.
Finally, a fourth tier of corporate patent owners included a large
number of corporations receiving relatively few patents each. This tier
38
accounted for 40.7% of all utility patents issued in 2001. As suggested
by the average of 2.6 patents per company in this group, the group was
comprised mostly of companies receiving one or two patents and a few
39
that obtained somewhat more. Many of the companies in this group—
literally tens of thousands of small companies with one or two patents—
are probably start-up companies that have staked their futures on the
commercialization of a new technology corresponding to their narrow
patent interests. The number of these corporate holders of small-scale
patent interests suggests the presence of numerous instances of
relatively isolated technological innovation outside of large corporate
environments. However, the large number of companies with only a
few patents also highlights the need for active and effective corporate
financing of small companies if the technologies being promoted by
these relatively small-scale patent holders are to be developed into
marketable products available to the public.
In addition to the increase in the percentage of patents owned by
corporate patent owners generally, the concentration of patent
ownership of the largest corporate patent owners also increased in the
past decade. During this period, the fraction of all utility patents owned
by a few large companies has steadily grown. The following table tracks
the percentage of all utility patents received by the top ten corporate
40
patent owners:
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1; UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 1991 (1992),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top91cos.htm; UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 1995 (1996),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top95cos.htm; TOP TEN PATENTING
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Year

Total Patents Received by
Top Ten Corporations

1991

8,045

Percentage of All Patents
Granted to Top Ten
Corporations
8.3%

1995
2001

9,991
16,758

9.9%
10.1%

A similar trend produced increased concentration in the patent
ownership among the top one hundred patent recipients. The number
of patents received by the top one hundred corporations rose from
29,647, or 29.2%, of all patents issued in 1995 to 51,666, or 31.2%, of all
41
patents issued in 2001.
D. Varying Scope and Concentration of Corporate Patent Ownership
Among Technology Fields
In certain technology areas, high proportions of corporate patent
ownership and high concentrations of such ownership among a very few
companies have been particularly extreme in recent years. Indeed, in a
few complex, resource intensive areas, individual patent ownership of
new patents has been almost unknown, reflecting the need for corporate
backing to discover and commercialize most or all patentable advances.
Because the numbers of patents issued in one year for certain
technology areas was quite small, the patent data studied in this portion
of the Article reflects totals for a five-year span, covering all utility
patents issued in the 1997–2001 period.
This Article does not attempt to document all of the corporate
patent ownership patterns for all of the technology categories covered
by U.S. patents. The discussions in this subsection focus on a few
important technology classes and the substantial variations in corporate
42
patent ownership for those classes.
Among these technology areas,
ORGANIZATIONS 2001, supra note 31.
41. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
ORGANIZATIONS 1995 (1996), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_95.pdf;
PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS 2001, supra note 32. The USPTO’s reporting of corporate
patent ownership in 1991 does not cover patent ownership by individual corporations other
than the top few corporations, thereby precluding comparisons of patent ownership of the top
one hundred corporations for 1991 with later figures.
42. The USPTO classifies the technologies covered by particular patents into
“technology classes.” Technology classes are “based on (1) technology associated with a
particular industry, or (2) subject matter having similar function, use, or structure.” UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM I-1
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three patterns of corporate patent ownership were found: (1) in some
fields corporate patent ownership is moderate and both corporate and
individual ownership are significant; (2) in additional fields corporate
patent ownership is very common, but spread among a substantial
number of corporations; and (3) in a third group of technology areas
corporate patent ownership is highly significant and ownership of
patents is highly concentrated in a few companies. These patterns of
corporate patent ownership and a few of the technology domains that
illustrate each pattern are described in the remainder of this subsection.
1. Moderate Corporate Ownership
While there are not many technology domains in which corporate
patent owners do not play a highly significant role, there are a few areas
of technology in which individual innovators constitute the bulk of
patent owners. For example, patents issued from 1997 through 2001 for
new tool designs reflected a high percentage of patents owned by
43
individuals and relatively little corporate ownership.
Within this
category, individually owned patents accounted for 84.5% of the total,
44
while corporate-owned patents only accounted for 15.5%. Corporate
ownership was spread among a substantial number of companies, with
the top ten corporate patent recipients taking only 10.9% of all patents
45
in this class.
This pattern of patent ownership suggests that many innovators in
this field are probably individuals or small groups of individual
inventors working in isolation from corporate support and resources.
Certainly, the relatively “low-tech” character of many new tool designs
would probably put many innovations in this field within the reach of

(2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/overview_dec02.pdf (last visited
Nov. 27, 2003). Every patent application is assigned to one or more classification categories
based on the technology addressed by the patent claims in the application. If the application
results in an issued patent, these classification designations are carried forward as part of the
published patent record and provide a useful tool for searching for patents by technology
type.
43. These advances fall within the USPTO’s Class 81, Tools: “In this class are tools
which are not structurally limited to any classified art. This class is limited to hand tools,
except in [certain noted subclasses].” UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS 81-1 (2004),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc081/defs081.pdf.
44. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 81, TOOLS,
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/081_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
45. See id.

GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

4/24/2006 6:49:31 AM

CORPORATE PATENTS

17

independent inventors. Furthermore, these sorts of devices may be
encountered by individuals in their personal lives, leading to an
appreciation of problems with present designs and innovative efforts to
fix those problems that are undertaken by individuals in their personal
capacities outside of any roles they may have as corporate employees.
Such innovations developed on personal time with personal resources
would typically fall outside any obligation to assign resulting patents to
the individuals’ corporate employers, even if the individuals were
employed by corporations. Thus, the resulting patents tend to remain in
the hands of the individuals who produce patentable tool designs.
2. Extensive Corporate Ownership—Widely Distributed
A second pattern of corporate patent ownership involving extensive
corporate ownership distributed among a substantial number of
corporations was present in several technology fields from 1997 through
2001. This pattern of patent ownership governed advances in such
widely divergent technological classes as refrigeration equipment,
bodies and tops of land vehicles, and artificial intelligence.
46
Refrigeration advances showed a 74.4% ownership by corporations
from 1997 through 2001, with only 25.6% of patents for such advances
47
issued to individuals.
The top ten corporate patent recipients
48
accounted for 31.2% of all patents in this class.
49
The invention class covering bodies and tops of land vehicles
reflected a 62.5% corporate ownership from 1997 through 2001, with
46. See UNITED STATES. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, CLASS 62, REFRIGERATION 62-1 (2004),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc062/defs062.pdf.
This class includes (1) processes and apparatus peculiar to removing heat from a
substance, usually by a change of phase of a coolant or refrigerant, as by
evaporation, melting or sublimation, (2) the resultant product of part (1), e.g., ice,
liquefied or solidified gases, and (3) processes and apparatus peculiar to handling
the latter as a stored product, not elsewhere provided for.
Id.
47. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 62,
REFRIGERATION, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/062_tor.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2003).
48. See id.
49. UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 296, LAND VEHICLES: BODIES AND TOPS 296-1 (2003),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc296/defs296.pdf. “This class includes
patents relating to that portion of a land vehicle, secured to the running-gear thereof, which
operates as a receptacle or load carrier, together with the top or cover therefor.” See id.
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50

37.5% of such patents issued to individuals. The top ten corporate
51
patent holders accounted for 27.4% of all patents in this class.
For the patent class covering data processing inventions related to
52
artificial intelligence, the degree of corporate ownership from 1997
53
through 2001 was 81.2%, and the individual ownership was 18.8%.
The top ten corporate owners received 50.2% of all the patents issued in
54
this class.
While corporations clearly predominated as patent owners in these
technology classes, a substantial number of individuals also received
patents in these areas, indicating that substantial advances were possible
and even common in both individual and corporate contexts. These
types of technologies are apparently ones that can be explored at the
cutting edge without the sorts of equipment or resources that belong
exclusively to corporate innovators. While corporate backing of some
sort is apparently helpful and common, the involvement of massive
corporations engaged in large-scale efforts within the field does not
seem essential, as is reflected in the relatively small portion of the total
number of patents received by the top ten corporate patent recipients.
These technologies seem to be successfully advanced and
commercialized by numerous small to medium-sized corporations rather
than a few corporate giants that produce large quantities of patentable
advances.

50. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PATENTING BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION,
1997–2001, CLASS 296, LAND VEHICLES: BODIES AND TOPS,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/296_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14,
2002).
51. See id.
52. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 706, DATA PROCESSING—ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 706-1 (2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc706/defs706.pdf.
This is a generic class for artificial intelligence type computers and digital data
processing systems and corresponding data processing methods and products for
emulation of intelligence (i.e., knowledge based systems, reasoning systems, and
knowledge acquisition systems); and including systems for reasoning with
uncertainty (e.g., fuzzy logic systems), adaptive systems, machine learning systems,
and artificial neural networks.
Id.
53. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001,
CLASS 706, DP: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (DATA PROCESSING),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/706_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
54. See id.
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3. Extensive Corporate Ownership—Highly Concentrated
A third set of technology classes had corporate patent ownership
patterns reflecting large percentages of corporate ownership
concentrated in a few organizations. This type of patent ownership—
probably indicating the need for extensive resources and accumulated
expertise to support advances—was present from 1997 through 2001 for
patents falling under the semiconductor device manufacturing process,
electrical connector, telecommunications, cleaning compounds, and
software development, installation, and management invention classes.
For inventions involving semiconductor device manufacturing
55
processes, corporate patent owners received 98.6% of the 16,541 utility
56
patents issued from 1997 through 2001. Individuals received almost
none of these patents, accumulating only 1.4% of the patents in this
57
class over this period. Within the corporate owner group, ownership
was highly concentrated among a few large owners. The top ten
corporate patent owners accounted for 48.7% of the patents in this
58
class.
59
In the area of electrical connectors, the level of corporate patent
55. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 438, SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICE MANUFACTURING 438-1 (2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc438/defs438.pdf.
A. This class provides for manufacturing a semiconductor containing a solidstate device by a combination of operations wherein:
(1) no other class provides for the overall combination, and
(2) the intent is to use the electrical properties of the semiconductor in the
device for at least one of the following purposes: (a) conducting or modifying an
electrical current, (b) storing electrical energy for subsequent discharge within a
microelectronic integrated circuit, or (c) converting electromagnetic wave energy to
electrical energy or electrical energy to electromagnetic energy.
Id.
56. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 438,
SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICE MANUFACTURING: PROCESS,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/438_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14,
2002).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 439, ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS 439-1 (2004),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc439/defs439.pdf.
This is the generic class for a pair of mated conductors comprising at least two
electrically conducting elements which are interconnected to permit relative motion
of such conducting elements during use without a break in electrical conductivity
there between (see Subclass References to the Current Class, below).

GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED

4/24/2006 6:49:31 AM

20 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1

ownership was nearly as high as the area of semiconductor device
manufacturing processes with corporations obtaining 88.1% of all such
patents from 1997 through 2001 and individuals controlling the
60
remaining 11.9%.
The corporate ownership was again highly
concentrated, with the top ten corporate patent recipients gaining
61
51.7% of all patents in the class over this period.
62
Telecommunications patents were received in a similar pattern
from 1997 through 2001. Corporations received 95.3% of all such
63
patents and individuals received the remaining 4.7%.
One owner,
Also, this is the generic class for a device constituting an electricity conducting
contact between conductors of electricity; wherein the joint is of a type which may
be readily made and broken, repeatedly by attachment and detachment of contact
supporting structure on each conductor.
(1) Note. A soldered joint or joint formed by twisting together a pair of
conductors and any of various other splices that is more or less permanent in nature
is not generally provided for in this class. See the reference to Class 174 below for
location of a device relating to such a splice joint. Also, see below for the scope of
this class with regard to general utility and the lines with respect to other classes
providing for a joint, per se.
(2) Note. Included under this class definition is a device known in the art as a
contact plug, an outlet receptacle, a lamp socket, a vacuum tube socket, a
connection block, a cable terminal, a cable joint, a binding post, a cube tap, a
grounding strap, etc.
(3) Note. This class also includes a device specialized for use with an electrical
connector and not elsewhere classifiable. Such a device may be, for example, any of
certain types of mounting or supporting means, a locking device, a shield or cover, a
strain relieving device, etc.
Id.
60. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 439, ELECTRICAL
CONNECTORS, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/439_tor.htm (last
visited Dec. 14, 2002).
61. See id.
62. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 455, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 455-1 (2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc455/defs455.pdf.
This is the generic class for modulated carrier wave communications not
elsewhere classifiable.
Some art areas excluded from this class are: Alternating or pulsating current
telegraphy; Antennas; Broadcast or multiplex stereo; Condition responsive
indicating systems with a radio coupling link; Directive carrier wave systems;
Multiplex carrier wave communications; Paging via modulated carrier wave; Pulse
or digital communications which may be modulated onto a carrier wave; Reflected
carrier wave systems (e.g., radar); Selective (e.g., remote control); Telemarketing;
Television; Facsimile.
Id.
63. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
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Motorola, Inc., accounted for 12.6% of all patents in this class. As a
group, the top ten corporate patent owners accounted for 55.7% of all
65
patents in this class.
In a chemical context, the patents for cleaning compositions issued
from 1997 through 2001 also showed high levels of corporate patent
ownership and concentration of this ownership among a few large
66
corporations. The percentage of corporate ownership was 93.1% for
67
Corporate
this class, with individual ownership at only 6.9%.
ownership was even more concentrated than for the other patent classes
analyzed here. The top ten corporate patent owners received 64.5% of

TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 455,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS,http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/455_tor.htm
(last visited Dec. 14, 2002).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 510, CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES, AUXILIARY
COMPOSITIONS THEREFOR, OR PROCESSES OF PREPARING THE COMPOSITIONS 510-1
(2003), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc510/defs510.pdf.
This class includes the following subject matter, not provided for elsewhere,
when a utility set forth below is either (a) claimed or (b) solely disclosed.
(A) CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES which are
specialized and designed for, or peculiar to, use in cleaning or removing foreign
matter from solid surfaces.
(B) AUXILIARY COMPOSITIONS, PER SE, for perfecting the cleaning
compositions of this class or for perfecting a cleaning process (e.g. rinse- or dryeradded fabric softener compositions, etc.) for which there is no provision elsewhere.
(C) COMPOSITIONS OF THIS CLASS DEFINED IN TERMS OF
SPECIFIC PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (E.G., TABLET, COATED PARTICLE,
ETC.) – The lines generally prevailing between the composition classes and the
article classes are applicable to Class 510 unless otherwise indicated, with the
exception that Class 510 provides for a composition, per se, defined in terms of
specific structure, having a utility for Class 510.
(D) PACKAGES of compositions of this class, or other articles which
releasably enclose or support such compositions, for which there is no provision
elsewhere.
(E) PROCESSES OF PREPARING subject matter of A–D not provided for
elsewhere.
Id.
67. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 510,
CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES, AUXILIARY COMPOSITIONS
THEREFOR, OR PROCESSES OF PREPARING THE COMPOSITIONS,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/510_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2002).
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68

patents in this class.
Patents for software development, installation, and management
69
advances exhibited a similar ownership pattern. Corporations owned
70
Individual owners
96.1% of the patents for this technology class.
received only 3.9% of new patents in this class. The concentration of
patent ownership was particularly high, with the top ten patent
71
recipients gaining 70.6% of patents.
The highly concentrated pattern of corporate patent ownership in
these areas suggests that advantages related to large corporate size or
the scale of innovative efforts were important in these settings.
Certainly, the technological resources needed to engage in research are
large in many of these areas, effectively precluding independent
research by individuals. It may also be the case that personnel working
for large companies that manufacture products or provide services in
these areas encounter or learn of design flaws in existing products and
services to a greater extent than individuals acting alone, with the result
that personnel in these corporations are better informed about the goals
of innovation to improve the products or services. Alternatively, large
68. See id.
69. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 717, DATA PROCESSING: SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, INSTALLATION
AND MANAGEMENT 717-1 (2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc717/defs717.pdf.
This class provides for software program development tool and techniques including
processes and apparatus for controlling data processing operations pertaining to the
development, maintenance, and installation of software programs. Such processes
and apparatus include:
A. Processes and apparatus for program development functions such as
specification, design, generation, and version management of source code programs.
B. Processes and apparatus for debugging of computer program including
monitoring, simulation, emulation, and profiling of software programs.
C. Processes and apparatus for translating or compiling programs from a highlevel representation to an intermediate code representation and finally into an
object or machine code representation, including linking, and optimizing the
program for subsequent execution.
D. Processes and apparatus for updating, installing, and version management
of developed code.
Id.
70. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 717, DP:
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, INSTALLATION, AND MANAGEMENT (DATA PROCESSING),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/717_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14,
2002).
71. See id.
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companies in these fields may find a stream of related patents to be
advantageous in other respects, such as serving as a continuing shield to
isolate company activities from competitive pressures or as bargaining
chips in efforts to gain cross-licenses concerning key technologies
controlled by other companies. Whether motivated by surrounding
business factors or the technological demands of research in these
settings, innovation by large-scale corporate innovators seems to
predominate in the five fields described here. In these fields, corporate
patent ownership was extremely high and individual research and the
promotion of patentable innovations by individuals does not seem to be
a realistic patent law goal. Rather, effective innovation in these fields
seems to depend on the incentives and rewards that patents provide to
corporations as they pursue and fund their research in these resourceintensive fields and develop and market related products and services.
In these settings—and in the technological contexts described earlier
in which numerous small companies are active innovators—the
encouragement of effective and efficient means to bring new
innovations to the public will be furthered by strengthening the role of
patents in promoting corporate efforts to pursue innovation by groups
of inventors and to apply large-scale resources to these tasks. These
same ends will also be furthered by creating supporting corporate law
standards that will aid in the funding and completion of these
innovation efforts. The remainder of this Article examines how patents
may influence innovation by corporate organizations and suggests some
changes in patent and corporate laws that might better encourage
innovation in corporate contexts.
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF CORPORATE INNOVATORS
Several features make corporations different sorts of innovators
than individuals and may require adjustments in patent and corporate
laws to fully support corporate innovation. The key features of
corporate innovators that distinguish them from individual innovators
acting outside corporate environments include the following:
(1) The tendency of corporate organizations to pursue technological
discoveries and the development of related new products through group
action;
(2) The ability of corporate organizations to gather, organize, and
apply resources to innovation on a superhuman scale;
(3) The need for collective funding of corporate innovators—often
from remote investors having little direct contact with the
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corporations—in order to support large-scale innovation and related
manufacturing and marketing programs; and
(4) The obligations of company owners and managers to share
aspects of control over corporate innovation as dictated by corporate
governance processes.
This section describes these distinctive qualities of corporate
innovators. The next section assesses how these distinctive qualities
relate to patent incentives and related features of corporate laws
supporting innovation.
A. Introduction
As described by noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith, the
purpose of a corporation is “to do business as would an individual but
with the added ability to assemble and use the capital of several or
numerous persons. In consequence, it can undertake tasks beyond the
72
financial reach of any single person.”
When corporations initiate technological innovation efforts—as
opposed to acquiring rights in fully developed technological devices or
73
processes discovered and perfected by others —Galbraith’s brief
description identifies many of the distinctive attributes that distinguish
corporate innovators from individual actors. First, corporate behavior
in pursuit of innovation has a superficial resemblance to individual
behavior; that is, corporate actions in pursuit of innovation follow
patterns that track the actions of rational individuals. In this respect,
organizational innovation by corporations can roughly be understood by
thinking of corporate innovation as individual innovation writ large.
Corporations, like individual innovators, use rational means to analyze
consumer problems that might be suitable for technological solutions
(typically through marketing studies or evaluations of consumer
products in the corporations’ existing field of interest), seek such
solutions though rationally directed and limited research, and transform
their discoveries into perfected, manufactured, and marketed products

72. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 75 (4th ed. 1985).
73. As used here, “innovation” refers to the discovery of a technological advance
combined with the product development, perfection, and implementation steps necessary to
bring the new technology into public usage. Innovation can occur through original work at
any stage of this process. Patents can influence each of these stages. The promise of patents
can encourage the pursuit of new technological discoveries with identifiable utility. Existing
patents (or anticipated patents) can encourage innovation at the later stages of product
perfection, manufacturing, and marketing by improving the effectiveness or reducing the cost
of an exclusively marketed patented product.
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through the rational allocations of appropriate resources, often in
competition with other internal demands for the use of the same
resources.
Corporations frequently create their own internal systems
resembling markets for the allocation of resources to potential
74
corporate tasks, meaning that they incorporate their own pressures
which tend to limit product research and development activities to only
those efforts that seem rational and efficient in light of the likely degree
of public interest and commercial return of resulting corporate products
75
and services. Because of these ongoing pressures stemming from the
looming attraction of alternative uses of corporate resources and the
need for corporate managers to continuously turn away from those
alternative uses to keep supporting successive steps of corporate
innovation, the scope of corporate efforts aimed at innovation may be
particularly fine-tuned, rationally directed, and scaled in ways that cause
them to be highly efficient. In short, corporate innovators may be, in
effect, exceptionally efficient substitutes for individual innovators, not
just large-scale counterparts to individual innovators.
However, it is easy to make too much of the analogy of corporations
to individual innovators and to think that patents and other incentives
for innovation will have similar impacts on corporations and individuals.
There are major differences in the actions, resources, financing, and

74. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1225 (1984)
(observing that the tendency of modern corporations to operate in discrete divisions or
operating units aids corporate management in monitoring the success of discrete corporate
activities and in allocating resources among those internal activities with the greatest
potential returns; in effect, such a multi-divisional corporation becomes a miniature capital
market in which internal investment in future corporate activities is allocated in accordance
with perceived potential for investment return).
75. The availability of patent rights for certain types of technological developments
may cause corporations to affirmatively pursue such developments at the expense of efforts
to advance technologies that are less likely to produce proprietary interests and associated
opportunities for commercialization. This type of choice undertaken internally as corporate
managers allocate product research and development resources was described by one
observer as follows:
[I]f the area is wide open for exploitation, the intellectual property strategy may
show the potential for numerous patentable inventions that in turn will require a
team of researchers. On the other hand, if there is limited opportunity for
proprietary development, then perhaps very few or no technical resources should be
devoted to that product, or those resources should be geared to buying or licensing
the technology.
H. Jackson Knight, Intellectual Property “101”: What Executives and Investors Need to Know
About Patent Rights and Strategy, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING WISELY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 22 (Bruce Berman ed., 2002).
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governance of corporations that make them significantly different types
of innovators from individuals. These differences are described in the
remainder of this section.
Corporations differ from individuals in ways that make corporations
both better and worse innovators than individuals in certain respects.
First, corporations innovate through group conduct rather than through
the isolated actions of one inventor or a small group of inventors acting
76
as individuals. Corporate innovation is consequently subject to the
strengths and weaknesses of group action.
Second, corporate
innovation often benefits in critical ways from the organization and
77
application of superhuman resources to innovative tasks. When these
superhuman resources are organized and applied effectively, corporate
innovators acting with collective resources have the ability to make
discoveries and advance technological knowledge in various ways that
are beyond the reach of any individual. Third, the generation and
application of capital from backers (ranging from a relatively small,
directly contacted group of investors at the outset of a corporate
innovator’s existence to a widely distributed, loosely engaged set of
investors in a publicly traded corporate innovator) is an ongoing feature
78
of corporate innovation and a source of related performance pressures.
Fourth, corporate managers and employees seeking innovations are
accountable to corporate shareholders and must share with investors
through corporate governance processes some degree of management
79
information and control over corporate innovation. These distinctive
aspects of corporate innovation are examined in this section as they
relate to the potential influence of patent rights and incentives.
B. Group Action
1. How Group Action Influences Corporate Innovation
Under the leadership of corporate managers who translate their own
visions of corporate goals into corporate actions, corporations tend to
pursue technological innovation through rationally constructed means
of gaining access to and implementing technologies that promote the
80
corporations’ business interests.
Not every company leader sees

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
Corporations may seek to advance their interests through a number of strategies
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technological innovation as the best means to business success. The
development of new technologies is only one of several competing
strategies that a company may use to advance its business interests.
Alternatives to technological innovation include adopting a business
strategy that emphasizes the increasingly efficient use of old
technologies, the marketing of carefully improved products based on old
technologies, or the expansion of commercial success based on product
image rather than product performance. Even if a company wishes to
adopt new technologies in its practices or products, it can often just use
new technologies that are not legally restricted or obtain the rights to
use restricted technologies by licensing innovations produced by others,
by acquiring the patents controlling these innovations, or by acquiring
ownership of the companies that control the innovations.
Despite the availability of these sorts of alternative strategies, many
companies maintain at least some component of internal innovation
regarding their products and practices. While efforts to innovate in
internal operating practices generally involve similar steps, the
discussion here will focus on steps that companies take to develop new
technologies for inclusion in products or services offered to customers.
In developing and implementing new technologies to improve
products and services, group efforts may come into play at several stages
of corporate operations. Specifically, group efforts may alter and
enhance innovative activities in corporations at any or all of the
following stages of innovation: (1) identifying consumer needs that are
unmet or poorly met by current technologies, (2) experimenting with
technological solutions to these needs, (3) testing the resulting invention
designs, (4) developing and perfecting resulting products and services,
and (5) commercializing these products or services by implementing
81
necessary manufacturing and marketing programs.
based on the development of new intellectual property. For example, using a technologybased strategy, a company may seek to develop advances in a particular sub-domain of
technology with the hope that the company’s control over that aspect of technology will help
it to create and market a series of related products over time. Under an alternative productbased strategy, a company may seek to develop protectable product features that will allow
the company to maintain exclusive marketing advantages concerning a product or product
line. Under a third, invention-based strategy, a company developing a particular engineering
breakthrough, which is a distinctive departure from earlier engineering approaches to the
same design problem, may seek to control product implementations based on that new
approach even if the commercial significance and means of exploiting the new approach are
not yet fully apparent. See Knight, supra note 75, at 14–17.
81. See generally JOLLY, supra note 27, at 2–3. A corporation need not engage in
group actions in all of these areas for the considerations addressed here to arise. It is
sufficient that at least one of these types of functions is undertaken through group activity.
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In short, by operating within a corporate infrastructure and applying
corporate resources, working groups within corporate organizations can
pursue a variety of key innovative tasks, often through means and with
results that would be impossible for an individual innovator to attain.
However, in applying group activities to innovative tasks in corporate
organizations, employee groups are subject to several operational
strengths and weaknesses that are endemic to group action in business
82
settings.
2. Potential Benefits of Group Action for Technological Innovation
Innovation conducted through group efforts within corporate
organizations may produce useful advances in the discovery,
development, and popularization of patented inventions. The benefits
of working through groups of corporate employees and with large-scale
Furthermore, it is not necessary that all of these steps be taken by one company. In many
instances, for example, a small company or individual acts as the initial innovator, makes an
invention, and transfers the resulting patent and technological know-how to a larger
company. Up to this point, the process of innovation may have been undertaken by either
one individual or a very small group. However, subsequent steps in the process of bringing
the technology involved to the public in the form of widely available products or services may
be undertaken through group action within the large corporation that eventually controls the
patent and the technology. As of this point in the process, the group action considerations
addressed here become relevant.
82. An agency process is present whenever one party is called upon to act on behalf of
another. For a complete treatment of the features of agency processes, see Kenneth J.
Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). In these types of settings,
the effectiveness of three types of features will determine the efficiency and success of an
agency process in achieving results desired by a principal: (1) mechanisms for defining the
conduct desired by the principal, (2) mechanisms for monitoring whether that conduct is
being undertaken by the agent, and (3) mechanisms for tying the agent’s performance
rewards to the completion of the desired conduct. See id.
All agency processes are subject to certain costs. Agents “seldom work for free, they
require continuing supervision, and, worst of all, they often serve themselves at the expense
of their principals.”
Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1638 (1999). Typical costs of accomplishing tasks
through agency relationships include (1) expenditures by principals to monitor the actions of
agents, (2) bonding expenditures by agents to engender trust by principals, and (3) the
residual losses due to divergences of agents’ conduct from the actions desired by principals.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
[In general,] [a]gency . . . involves an important tradeoff. While it allows us to
accomplish more things more cheaply, it carries its own costs and dangers,
particularly the risk that our agents will shirk and work against our interests in
pursuing their own. Our goal, then, should be to maximize the benefits of agency
while minimizing its costs.
Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra, at 1638–39.
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corporate assets may be realized in many stages of the innovation
process from problem definition efforts, through invention discovery
steps, to product introduction and popularization stages.
In identifying and understanding problems with existing products or
services, groups of persons working for companies may use their
collective expertise, experience, or information sources to identify
consumer needs, marketing opportunities, and technical capabilities that
suggest invention potential. By effectively combining their talents,
knowledge, and command over resources, groups of employees within
corporations can identify opportunities for innovation in existing
consumer products or settings over a broader range of circumstances
than individuals could identify.
Once research is under way, corporations can sometimes use
resource planning and large-scale capital funding to apply physical
resources and research staffs on scales that make possible types of
scientific and engineering research that would be simply impossible for
an individual to fund or carry out.
Similarly, once a new technology has been discovered, groups of
developers and marketers within corporations may be able to bring
together information about customers’ activities and desires in
specifying particular product and service features based on the new
technology. Somewhat differently composed groups of corporate
employees will also have the types of collective information needed to
effectively and efficiently design and implement the initial
manufacturing and marketing programs for newly designed products.
In each of these settings, the strengths of group information
collection, analysis, and effort can be brought to bear to produce better
evaluations and actions than would be possible through the capabilities
of one individual. While these sorts of group efforts certainly require
coordination to be effective and will involve some special costs in this
regard, the net benefits of group action in these areas can be
considerable. When group action can draw upon the accumulated
experience of multiple corporate employees with past products and
product-related corporate systems, such efforts can produce new
product designs that avoid past product errors, that build on corporate
production and marketing strengths, and that utilize the collective
knowledge of corporate personnel about their industry and customer
preferences to the public’s benefit.
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3. Potential Weaknesses of Group Action for Technological
Innovation
Unfortunately, group efforts may also introduce errors or
inefficiencies into innovative processes. These problems can stem from
difficulties in motivation, coordination, and information handling arising
in group processes.
In order to be motivated to diligently pursue corporate interests in
carrying out innovative efforts, persons working in groups of corporate
employees must have some personal reason or motivation to seek
innovations that will serve corporate interests. In some instances, this
type of motivational alignment—in which the interests of individuals are
aligned with their corporate employer’s interests in innovation—can be
achieved through promises of salary increases or promotional
opportunities that are tied to success in innovation. Under these
arrangements, successes in corporate innovation produce increased
individual salaries or promotions, thereby tying individual researchers’
interests and motivations to corporate interests.
The patents arising out of corporate employees’ discoveries are
typically required by employment contracts to be assigned to the
inventors’ corporate employers. Hence, there is typically little or no
incremental compensation for producing patentable inventions and
transferring related patents per se. However, individual employees
must still be given incentives to seek patentable inventions for the
benefit of their employers even though the employees will not own the
patents themselves and may gain no direct benefit from the enforcement
of those patents. To encourage efforts to discover patentable inventions
and to seek related patents, companies frequently promise bonuses for
the completion of patent applications or payments to individual
inventors of percentages of later licensing royalties derived from patents
83
stemming from the employees’ discoveries.
83. Bonuses are a common means to encourage employees to disclose inventions to
their employers or to complete the paper work necessary to obtain a patent:
Typically, bonus awards are given to inventors to encourage disclosures. These
may be progressive in size, depending on the disposition of the idea. For example, a
$100 bonus may be given upon submission of the disclosure statement, $500 to
$1,000 upon approval of filing a patent application based on the idea, and $1,000 to
$2,000 upon actual filing. In the event a patent of significant value issues, an
additional substantial bonus may be granted at the patent committee’s discretion.
The CEO should announce this bonus award policy and personally deliver the
message that the quality and quantity of the ideas submitted will be taken into
consideration during each employee’s evaluation.
Leo R. Reynolds, Intellectual Property Assets, in STARTING UP AND ADVISING AN
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While these motivational measures are helpful, they may still not
adequately align corporate employees’ efforts regarding patentable
inventions to the interests of their corporate employers. Corporate
employees may undertake significantly weaker efforts to make
patentable discoveries than would be the case if they would own the
resulting patents because their corporate employer, and not they, will
reap most of the benefits from the patents. In these circumstances,
where employees may be satisfied with their guaranteed salaries and not
greatly concerned about incremental bonuses or highly contingent
payments of future royalty percentages for making patentable
inventions, the motivations of individual employees will not conform to
those of their corporations and corporate interests in patentable
inventions will not be fully served.
Alternatively, corporate incentive systems concerning patentable
inventions may over-encourage the pursuit of such inventions. When
the seeking and obtaining of a patent becomes an end in itself,
corporate employees may pursue any sort of patentable discovery even
when the invention being sought does not have significant economic
potential as the basis for commercial products or services. In such
circumstances, incentives to create patentable inventions, such as salary
bonuses for such inventions or related patent applications, may
encourage inefficient efforts to pursue patents, leading to discoveries
when there is either no net benefit to the corporation involved or even if
there is some net benefit, the benefit is less than the corporate gains that
might have been realized had the same resources been devoted to other
profit-making activities.
Coordination problems may also plague efforts to produce corporate
innovations through group efforts. In innovative efforts, as with other
group activities in corporate enterprises, multiple employees require
coordination in order to work effectively towards a common goal. This
type of coordination becomes a significant burden as groups become
large. When this sort of coordination is done poorly, it may also be a
source of great inefficiency and waste in corporate innovation programs.
Even when efforts of multiple parties are properly coordinated to
pursue innovative goals, gaps in the communication of critical
information among multiple innovators may cripple the effectiveness of
their efforts. Particularly when the successful completion of tasks by
one group member depends on prior steps being performed by another
member, accurate and complete communication between such parties is
EMERGING MASSACHUSETTS BUSINESS 4-1, 4-14 (Lawrence H. Gennari ed., 2001).
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often essential for effective group action.
C. Extensive Resources
Corporate efforts to discover and to perfect useful inventions
sometimes also differ from individual efforts in the size and nature of
the resources that corporations can apply to innovative tasks.
Corporations can apply extensive resources to innovative programs, in
part, because investor backing gives the corporations the funding to
acquire these resources. Also, if a company is pursuing multiple
research projects in a given technological domain, the costs of particular
equipment or personnel can be spread across the multiple projects in a
way that no individual innovator would be capable of doing. In short,
corporations frequently have access to more resources supporting
innovation and, through careful planning, can make better use of the
resources they have.
Corporations with expensive equipment or other types of costly
research infrastructures may have sole access to certain research
domains. In many fields in which the study of new technologies requires
the application and coordination of extensive, complex resources and
the actions of numerous personnel, corporate innovation is the only
innovation. It is unlikely, for example, that an individual inventor could
marshal the resources and supporting personnel needed to make
substantial advances in integrated circuit designs. In short, corporate
efforts to advance technology through group efforts and the extensive
application of capital gained from multiple investors is the only viable
path of technological advance in these sorts of complex, resource
intensive domains. In such settings, the impact of patent and corporate
law standards on corporate incentives and affairs are particularly
important: if these standards are not successful in encouraging advances
or impede the discovery or popularization of advances in some way,
there are no alternative channels of individual innovation that patents
can encourage as a means of achieving equivalent public gains from the
technology involved.
In some industries and innovative settings, the resources required
for innovation and the group actions needed to complete it are so
substantial that only large corporations are sufficient to initiate and to
conduct effective innovation. For example, in the pharmaceutical
industry, the equipment and testing procedures needed to develop new
drugs are enormous; thus, only innovative effort conducted on a large
corporate scale is likely to be effective in producing new product
designs. In these contexts, innovation is, by virtue of the nature of the
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innovative processes and resources needed, concentrated in the
operations of a few giant corporations.
D. Capital Needs
The need to obtain capital in order to facilitate large-scale
innovation efforts and to keep the support of existing investors over the
course of innovation programs is a source of ongoing pressure on
corporate innovators.
This pressure stems from requirements—
privately imposed by individual investors in small companies and
statutorily imposed in large companies that are publicly traded—of
disclosures and reports to potential and existing investors about the
nature and expected business value of various innovative programs and
technological discoveries. The need for capital may also encourage
inefficient efforts to hurry innovative products into production in order
to realize profits at the earliest possible time and thereby generate more
capital or placate existing investors.
The need for capital in conducting research programs and
developing products from the resulting discoveries is not peculiar to
patented inventions, but will apply when any type of product or process
innovation is pursued through corporate enterprises. However, the
association of patent interests with promising technologies allows a
relatively concrete value to be attached to those technologies at an early
stage in the development of related products and marketing programs.
By giving corporate managers a set of patent assets and exclusive
marketing opportunities to point to in fundraising activities, patents on
key technologies can entice investor interest in the funding of further
rounds of activities that are needed to transform an unproven new
technology into specific product designs, to establish manufacturing
programs for the resulting products, and to undertake the initial
marketing efforts needed to popularize those products.
Corporate ownership of patents permits the ownership interests of
persons providing financing of product, manufacturing, and marketing
development efforts to be combined in convenient ways with prior
corporate ownership interests given to technology discoverers in
exchange for an assignment of their patents and to an initial corporate
management team. Investors bringing critical new money into a
company that is developing a new technology can simply be given stock
in a sufficient ownership percentage to reflect the degree of risk being
taken by the new investors. This percentage will typically reflect the
scope of interest that the venture capitalists or other investors involved
feel is necessary to ensure that, when the company is successful and sold
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at a later point, the investors’ likely share of the resulting proceeds will
represent a return on their initial investment at a rate that justifies the
risks that they are taking in investing in an untried technology, and
84
typically, an untried company.
E. Governance Influences
In carrying out innovative efforts with funding provided by multiple
investors, corporations sacrifice some of the control that they would
85
otherwise have over the course of innovative efforts. Corporate laws
do not generally allow shareholders to take over the day-to-day
management of the companies that they own, reserving the final say on
day-to-day corporate matters to the boards of directors and senior
86
executives of each company. However, corporate laws regarding the
internal control or “governance” of corporations specify several features
of corporate operations that limit the freedom of choice of senior
executives and that help shareholders to hold these executives
87
accountable for their management decisions.
In extreme cases,
84. See Tom Smith, A Venture Capital Analysis,
http://www.morebusiness.com/running_your_business/financing/vent-cap.brc#value (last
visited Oct. 8, 2005). Typically, venture capitalists “seek to earn between 5 and 10 times their
initial investment within a 5–8 year [period of expected investment].” Id.
85. Corporate and securities laws require companies to adopt governance processes
under which shareholders possess powers to select or change the members of a company’s
board of directors. Company managers are, at least formally, accountable to the board
members whom the shareholders select. Not only do corporate and securities laws impose
substantive checks on management action through these governance mechanisms but also
generally require that corporate managers disclose accurate information to shareholders
about the status of corporate affairs. These accountability and information disclosure
obligations limit the absolute control of managers over corporate affairs in ways that are
designed to reassure shareholders and to limit the risks shareholders face in entrusting
investments to companies.
86. See, e.g., 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1290 (2004) (“The directors of a
corporation are its executive representatives charged with the administration of its internal
affairs and the management and use of its assets.”).
87. Corporate governance mechanisms place a number of structural limitations on
important activities undertaken by corporate managers, such as efforts to obtain and to
enforce patents. The primary process for accomplishing this is a hierarchy of accountability
of corporate managers to superiors and of senior executives to corporate board members. In
addition, corporate governance processes typically produce ongoing disclosures to
shareholders about performance by top managers in material areas, such as patent
management and enforcement, thereby aiding shareholders in taking that performance into
account in shareholder voting. Corporate boards serve what Ira Millstein has described as a
“certifying” function in evaluating the performance of senior managers and reporting on or
“certifying” the quality of that performance in disclosures to shareholders. Ira M. Millstein,
The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1493–94 (1993). He concludes
that this certifying process has positive impacts in both limiting management conduct and
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corporate governance processes can force changes in corporate
management or shifts in corporate ownership to new parties who
88
demand changes in management and business directions.
The need for periodic information reporting to shareholders and the
need to adhere to shareholder decision processes that hold senior
managers accountable for corporate performance sometimes constitute
indirect limitations on the course of corporate innovation efforts and
distinguish those efforts from individual endeavors to pursue and
popularize inventions. Shared control held by corporate shareholders
and managers can lead to background struggles that hinder the course
of innovative efforts or, at least, make innovation efforts inefficient and
unnecessarily costly. However, the threat of being held accountable and
potentially removed by shareholders looms over senior executives and
creates incentives for attention to corporate and shareholder interests
that may encourage careful attention to the development and
popularization of patented technologies and related products. Hence,
while the present system of partial shareholder control over corporate
activities and innovative efforts may sometimes detract from the
singular vision and focused pursuit of innovative programs in corporate
settings, no generally effective substitute for aligning the interests of
communicating positive management performance features to shareholders:
The process of corporate governance will never become, nor should it be, free of
tension. There should be constructive tension between shareholders and boards,
and between boards and managers. This does not mean bullhorns, coercion, threats,
and hostility. Such means are out of place absent a total unwillingness by boards
and managers to respond. But it does mean accountability. Neither boards nor
shareholders should ever cease to be vigilant over their respective charges.
A “certifying board” provides that accountability mechanism—accountability
of the board to the shareholders, and of managers to the board. And it is a good
prescription for all, including the managers. An independent credible board is not
just good for the corporation and its shareholders; a credible board can be
management’s greatest ally. It can certify to shareholders in times of trouble that
management is pursuing the appropriate course.
Id.
88. Persons willing to acquire a substantial percentage of the stock of a company can
sometimes mount a corporate takeover and force a change in corporate managers. Indeed,
the threat of such a change can cause corporate managers to be highly attentive to keeping
corporate performance levels and stock prices high in order to curb shareholder enthusiasm
for sales of stock to persons potentially mounting a takeover attempt. In this respect, the
threat of a takeover can substitute for direct shareholder monitoring in encouraging
corporate managers to pursue profitable corporate performance. With respect to patent
interests, this suggests that corporate managers will have ongoing reasons to maximize patent
value even in the absence of detailed scrutiny or pressure from current shareholders. See
John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1016–20 (1993).
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senior managers and shareholders has as yet been found. Consequently,
corporate governance limitations continue to bear on the nature of
innovation in corporate settings and the ways that such innovation is
influenced by corporate shareholders.
As part of the governance processes providing shareholders with
opportunities to hold corporate managers accountable for their
direction of corporate innovation programs, corporate managers may be
obligated to provide special disclosures to shareholders of material
information about innovation programs and related patent interests.
Senior managers will have obligations under securities laws and fraud
standards to be complete and accurate in information provided to
shareholders about innovation programs and patent interests. Any
disclosures by senior managers about patent values or enforcement risks
that are so restricted or one-sided as to be materially misleading will
undercut the ability of shareholders to review the performance of
corporate managers with respect to key patents and will create a basis
for personal liability to the shareholders of the parties making the
89
incomplete or inaccurate statements. These requirements of accurate
and complete disclosures are direct reflections of the economic interest
of shareholders in the value of corporate patents and the need for
accurate information if shareholders are to review and to evaluate how
their company’s patent interests are being protected and
commercialized by corporate managers.
Corporate officers may also have duties to their corporations under
state corporation laws concerning the ways that the officers monitor
patent enforcement risks and respond to patent enforcement problems.
Because they are, in effect, stewards of the shareholders’ interests,
senior corporate managers have duties under state corporation laws to
monitor risks to corporate patent enforcement and to resolve problems
90
with such patents as they arise. When they fail to address known or
89. Materially misleading statements about patent interests or other key corporate
assets can form the basis for corporate and personal liability under federal securities laws.
See Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992); Robert A. Prentice & John H.
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of HighTech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1994).
90. Delaware law governs the duties of corporate officers and directors in most large
corporations because they are incorporated in that state.
[T]he question of whether a corporate director has become liable for losses to the
corporation through neglect of duty is determined by the circumstances. If he has
recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused
or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either
willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the
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reasonably discoverable risks regarding corporate patent ownership or
enforcement and their corporation suffers identifiable harm as a result,
corporate officers may be found to have breached their duties to their
91
corporation and be held personally liable for the corporation’s losses.
Similarly, if corporate managers take actions concerning the ownership
or enforcement of corporate patents that favor the managers at the
expense of their corporation, the managers may be seen as having
breached their fiduciary duties to their corporation and be held liable
92
for the damage that their corporation has suffered. These sorts of
law will cast the burden of liability upon him.
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
91. See American Bar Association, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 59 BUS. LAW.
1057, 1069–70 (2004).
A director should inquire into potential problems or issues when alerted by
circumstances or events suggesting that board attention is appropriate; for example,
inquiry is warranted when information provided on an important matter appears
materially inaccurate or inadequate or there is reason to question the veracity of
management. When directors uncover or receive from others information indicating
that the corporation is or may be experiencing significant problems in a particular
area of business, or may be engaging in unlawful conduct, they should make further
inquiry and follow up until they are reasonably satisfied that management is dealing
with the situation appropriately. Even when there are no such “red flags,” directors
should periodically satisfy themselves that the corporation maintains programs that
are appropriately designed to identify and manage business risks and reasonably
effective to maintain compliance with laws and corporate policies and procedures.
Id.
Corporate directors or officers may be personally liable based on inattention to the
mismanagement of key corporate assets like corporate patents when the directors or officers
were aware of flaws in patents or enforcement efforts, but failed to take actions to correct the
situation or to curb related corporate losses. Cf. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders
Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that, when there were repeated
indications to corporate directors that key production activities were being undertaken
illegally, “the directors’ decision to not act was not made in good faith and was contrary to
the best interests of the company” and, if proven, was a breach of duty supporting personal
liability of the directors for resulting corporate losses); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 814, 819
(6th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
directors’ sustained failure to act against a corporation’s systematic health care fraud
occurring from at least 1994 to 1996 alleged sufficient facts “to present a substantial
likelihood of liability”).
92. A corporate officer or director will breach his duty of loyalty when he promotes his
personal interests at the expense of his corporation’s interests:
The duty of loyalty requires a director’s conduct to be in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation—and not in the director’s own interest or in the
interest of another person (such as a family member) or an organization with which
the director is associated. Simply put, a director should not use the director’s
corporate position for personal profit or gain or for other personal or noncorporate
advantage.
American Bar Association, supra note 91, at 1070.
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limitations on the potential actions of corporate managers in securing
and enforcing patents are direct consequences of the shared ownership
of corporations and the corresponding duties of corporate managers to
seek and administer the ownership of patents as representatives of the
interests of their corporations and, ultimately, of its shareholders.
III. THE CORPORATE IMPACT OF PATENT REWARDS:
RECONSIDERING PATENT INCENTIVES IN CORPORATE SETTINGS
Patent rights are frequently justified based on their influence in
93
promoting innovative efforts. Starting from this premise, analysts have
specified several ways that patent rights might beneficially influence the
development of new inventions or encourage related processes used to
bring products and services based on new inventions to the public. This
section examines these justifications for patent rights and critiques their
implications in light of the probable influence of patent rights on
corporate innovation rather than individual innovation.
A. Reward Theory
Reward theory justifies patent rights on the ground that the
recognition of such rights rewards an innovator for the risk and expense
94
involved in producing a useful invention. Through the recognition of
patent rights, an inventor obtains a temporary monopoly over the
making, using, and selling of the patented invention. The value of the
temporary control over the invention depends, at least roughly, on the
degree of increased utility provided to users by the patented invention
and, therefore, the amount that users will pay for access to the invention

93. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 247 (1994).
[In understanding the impact of patent laws,] it is important to recognize the
primary problem that the patent system solves. This problem—often called the
“appropriability problem”—is that, if a firm could not recover the costs of invention
because the resulting information were available to all, then we could expect a much
lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation. In short, the patent system
prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby promotes
research and development (R & D) investment in innovation.
Id.
94. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (noting that allowing an inventor an
“exclusive privilege” to commercialize a patented invention is “the best proportioned, the
most natural, and the least burthensome” means to encourage technological innovation,
producing an infinite effect, yet costing nothing).
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over the cost of non-patented substitutes.
Reward theory has developed into two variants—one weak and one
96
strong. The weak version simply posits that patents are designed to
97
reward and encourage increased efforts to produce innovations.
However, the mechanism by which patents further this end is not
explained. The analyses in this Article describing how patents facilitate
the functions and success of corporate innovators provide several
possible explanations of the mechanisms whereby patent rewards
encourage socially valuable innovation and fulfill the broad purposes of
the patent system.
A second, strong version of reward theory suggests that patent rights
should only be recognized when the lure of potential patent rights has
98
actually influenced individual innovators.
Such a view would limit
patent rights to cases in which they have had a measurable impact on
innovative conduct. However, this approach is probably too narrow
because it is based on too restrictive a notion of how patents may
increase the public’s access to useful inventions. It fails to recognize
that, as argued in this Article, existing and potential patents can have
beneficial impacts on the operation of innovative corporations at the
organizational level that extend beyond the immediate development of
new inventions. These further impacts—such as the patent-influenced
generation of funding for post-invention product design and perfection
activities based on a new invention or the development and
implementation of manufacturing and marketing programs for
introducing products incorporating a new invention—are also valuable
to society because they expand the range of publicly available
innovations.
Patents create important corporate rewards in several ways that
encourage corporations to develop innovative products and to bring
those products to the public. Potential impacts of patents on innovation
95. See 2 JOHN STEWART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 548–49 (5th
ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1909) (explaining that patent rewards for useful innovations are
preferable to a government-administered bonus system rewarding innovations because
patents avoid discretion on the part of government officials and secure rewards to inventors
that are proportional to the usefulness of the inventions, with the rewards being paid by the
consumers who benefit from the inventions).
96. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 12, at 312–13.
97. See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 33–52 (1973).
98. See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 443–44 (2d ed. 1980); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:
Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989).
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in corporate environments including the following:
(1) Patents can serve as the basis for corporate financing efforts that
focus on and separately value innovation efforts, thereby bringing
investor backing to innovators who would otherwise lack the financial
99
backing and resources needed to commercialize innovative discoveries;
(2) Patents and the scope of returns they promise provide a basis for
identifying cost-justified innovation efforts and for securing investor
funding of innovation at levels that correspond at least roughly to the
100
expected public value of the inventions being sought;
(3) Patents and businesses aimed at producing new, patentable
innovations form attractive targets for risk-preferring investors, thereby
encouraging the efficient support for innovation by giving this subclass
of investors a relatively direct means to support high risk innovation
101
efforts;
(4) Patents can strengthen innovative companies by differentially
favoring innovative companies over other companies that fail to
innovate, thereby increasing the chances that innovators will survive and
serve as “repeat players” that continue to produce useful advances as
102
they engage in ongoing competition with less innovative companies;
(5) Patents create some rewards that are peculiar to corporations by
expanding the value of existing corporate marketing and manufacturing
103
efforts; and
(6) In some settings, where uses of enormous or complex resources
are the only ways to achieve innovation results, corporate backing opens
the door to new ranges of effective innovation and potential public
104
gains.
Each of these possible impacts of patent rewards in promoting
corporate innovation is assessed in this subsection.
1. Separating Innovation Incentives and Rewards from Manufacturing
and Marketing Capabilities
In influencing corporate behavior, patents bring technological
innovations a transferable value that is independent of particular
manufacturing and marketing efforts, thereby making such innovations
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.A.3.
See infra Part III.A.4.
See infra Part III.A.5.
See infra Part III.A.6.

GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

4/24/2006 6:49:31 AM

CORPORATE PATENTS

41

more attractive targets of corporate business activities and associated
corporate enterprises. By allowing innovations to be valued and
transferred, patents facilitate the separation of innovation from product
production, marketing, and delivery. While some companies may
engage in both innovation and the later stages of product delivery to the
public, this integration is not necessary. Companies can form around an
innovation opportunity, seeking corporate funding and organizing
corporate activities around the most efficient and effective means to
discover a new technology and reduce it to practice. The technology
can then be patented and transferred to another corporation with
greater resources via either an assignment of the resulting patents or a
merger of the innovating corporation into the larger corporation.
This process makes innovation its own separate business realm,
separating the risks and opportunities of this field from the areas of
manufacturing and marketing. Given that the latter may require
enormous resources and rely on accumulated expertise in long-standing
companies, the ability of innovators to separate out innovation efforts
and to pursue them through financing that is sufficient to support
innovation, but not later commercialization efforts, establishes a
valuable business option that expands opportunities for innovation. The
availability of this separate channel or means of innovation expands the
number and diversity of viable innovators beyond those relatively few
companies that would be able to both engage in effective innovation
and commercialize the resulting technological advances.
2. Scaling the Scope of Innovation Efforts and Achieving Efficient
Funding
By attaching a value to an invention that roughly reflects the value
of the invention in its full range of uses rather than just the use that a
particular company or set of consumers might make of the invention, a
patent can encourage the funding of efforts to pursue the invention up
to the full value of the invention to the public. Innovation expenses up
to this level will be cost-justified because the value of resulting patent
rights promises a payback corresponding to the increased utility of the
invention to the public, at least during the term of the patent. The
promise of this payback can, in turn, be the basis for efforts to raise
financial backing for innovation efforts from potential corporate
shareholders. The rough equation of patent value with consumer value
of the related invention will encourage associated corporate efforts that
are funded and tailored in their scope to match the probable public
value of the resulting innovations. In short, patents form a bridge
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linking the estimation of cost-justified corporate funding and
organizational effort to the public value of corporate innovations.
3. Providing Investment Opportunities for Risk-Preferring Investors
Businesses aimed at producing new, patentable innovations form
attractive targets for investors seeking high-risk investments with the
potential for a large return. By ensuring that the initial commercial
returns related to a particular innovation will come primarily to the
company completing the innovation and its investors, a corporate patent
can provide the reassurance to investors that their high-stakes “bet”
made by investing in a high-tech start-up company will be matched by a
return that reflects the full value of the patentable technologies that
result. Absent such a guarantee, investors would be worried about free
riders appropriating the value of any technology that was developed
with their investment dollars and would discount the potential value of
an innovative company’s efforts accordingly.
Indeed, because the circumstances potentially leading to
appropriation would not be within their knowledge or control, investors
might tend to overestimate the likelihood of appropriation of a new
innovation by companies that paid nothing to the original innovator,
thereby making backing of such an innovator seem even more risky
than would be suggested by the inherent risks of failure raised by
technology research and the high likelihood of losses stemming from
many innovation efforts. This combination of free rider risks layered on
top of innovation failure risks would be likely to deter many parties and
to significantly reduce investor interest in high-tech development
efforts. Patents counteract some sources of doubt about investment in
technology innovators by giving innovators the ability to reserve the
sole rights to commercialize a new technology to a single company,
thereby creating a legally-backed source of predictable returns for
investors in the company.
4. Strengthening Innovators over Technologically Stagnant Companies
Patents can also increase technological innovation by backing the
efforts of companies that are “repeat players” in innovative efforts.
Once a company assembles expertise and resources needed to innovate
in a given field and gains experience with advanced technologies in that
field, the company is a likely source of further advances. Value
returned in connection with an initial patented advance can help to fund
further innovative efforts and strengthen the company involved in
marketing efforts when it competes with other companies that have not
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discovered functionally important and commercially popular
technologies. By establishing a source of value and economic return
that distinguishes them from a less innovative companies, innovative
companies can survive in periods of competition and go on to further
rounds of innovative efforts. To the extent that these companies possess
personnel, expertise, or values that make them particularly adept at
multiple rounds of innovation, the success of an initial round, as backed
by patent rewards, can provide the basis for subsequent rounds, with
corresponding public benefits from any positive results in the
subsequent rounds.
A similar argument based on maintaining active markets for the
transfer of innovations can be made for companies that acquire a
technology valued by the public and thereby achieve a source of income
that allows them to survive over less innovative or less astute technology
acquirers. By strengthening the technologically astute companies that
place their acquisition funds behind innovative efforts rather than
strengthening less innovation-focused companies that might put their
resources behind increased marketing of old products or non-innovative
product differentiation efforts with little increase in consumer utility,
patent rights create important opportunities for transfers of rights to
innovations and associated means for companies using those
innovations successfully to produce related profits, engage in further
technology acquisitions and, ultimately, to bring more innovations to
public attention and availability.
5. Increasing Corporate Rewards by Complementing Existing
Marketing Efforts
Another reason why patents may have a distinct lure for corporate
innovators and, hence, create unusually strong rewards and incentives
for the pursuit of useful inventions in corporate settings is that patented
improvements in existing products or completely new inventions in the
same product field as a company’s previous endeavors can provide the
means for a company to extend and improve existing marketing efforts.
Patented improvements may allow a company to keep marketing its
products as the best in the field, either because the products have
greater actual utility or because they have certain distinctive and
patented features that appeal to consumer tastes and are unavailable in
competitors’ products.
In these circumstances, patents correlate with marketing potential
and value, a potential value that may be particularly large for
corporations with preexisting stakes in a given marketing domain. A
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new patented innovation may be seen as having value equal to the
perceived marketing benefits that the resulting patent rights and control
will gain the company involved rather than value equal to the increased
utility the invention will provide to the public. Hence, the real rewards
driving patent-related innovation may not be the objective value of the
patent rights themselves, but rather the perceived marketing value of
the rights in combination with preexisting products, marketing
programs, and consumer perceptions of the corporation involved. In
short, marketing context and potential may drive innovation efforts and
directions in some settings more than an objective assessment of the full
scope of technology value and related patent rewards.
These types of market-driven values associated with corporate
patents may enhance innovation incentives in ways that benefit the
public. A corporation with established marketing programs may be
well-informed about the product needs of its customers and perceive the
value to customers of particular innovations. Based on this information
about consumer preferences, the corporation’s managers may place a
much higher value on certain innovations and related patents than
would an innovator acting in relative isolation from the relevant
consumer and marketing information. As more efficient and complete
gatherers of consumer preference information than individual
innovators, corporations initiating innovation or technology acquisition
efforts may be particularly effective in targeting the direction and scope
of those efforts so as to meet consumer needs. The promise of patent
rewards in this context becomes a means whereby corporations can
translate existing marketing and consumer information into product
innovation programs that match consumer needs far better than
comparable efforts by less well-informed innovators acting outside of
corporate organizations.
On the other hand, market-driven rewards for patented innovations
may direct some innovative programs away from their proper focus on
product utility and public benefit towards a different emphasis on
strategic corporate marketing strength and products that cater to nonfunctional consumer preferences. To the extent that the marketing
potential of patented innovations is the driving force behind innovation
programs in certain corporations and that marketing potential deviates
in some way from increased utility to consumers, companies may fall
into a pattern of innovating for product differentiation’s sake rather
than seeking innovations with true improvements in product
functionality or efficiency. Whether this type of innovation is contrary
to the public interest depends on how closely the marketing success of
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the corporations involved correlates with improved product
functionality provided to customers. To the extent that product markets
value appealing product features over functional ones, product
development resources may be inefficiently diverted to focusing on
producing new appealing features rather than increasingly useful ones.
In this respect, the patent system may actually divert innovation efforts
away from products with substantial utility and towards products with
the modicum of utility needed to satisfy patent law standards and gain
patents, but with a perceived value that relates mostly to the vanity or
nonfunctional tastes of consumers.
6. Assembling Group Action or Extensive Resources Needed for
Innovation
In some highly complex or resource intensive fields like
pharmaceutical drug development or biotechnology engineering, the
range of group actions and extensive resources needed to advance
technological understanding effectively precludes individuals acting in
isolation from supporting organizations from being effective innovators.
Innovation in these settings is purely corporate because only through
the backing and group funding of multiple investors can the types of
resources and group actions needed to produce new innovations be
undertaken. There may be gradations in the size of the corporate
entities involved. For example, the pharmaceutical field includes a
number of small drug companies and several “big pharm” giants, which
105
are innovators in different drug areas.
However, all of these
companies, at their various size levels, conduct research and product
development efforts that are far beyond the capabilities and resources
of individual inventors.
The need for corporate backing of research programs to accomplish
certain types of innovation—and the enhancement of innovation
capabilities provided by such backing even in areas in which individual
innovation is possible—makes the processes for funding and
administering corporate backing of research efforts critical
considerations in the attainment of patent law goals. Ideally, patents
will encourage research efforts that entail the least development cost
possible for a given invention, thereby maximizing the net societal gain

105. See Dror Ben-Asher, In Need of Treatment? Merger Control, Pharmaceutical
Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 300–01 (2000) (describing the
respective advantages of relatively small and large innovators in the pharmaceutical field).
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from that invention. The public’s net benefit from the emergence and
popular adoption of a new, patented invention is the net increase in
total societal utility, taking into account the total increase in utility
experienced by users of the invention, but lessened by the costs of
developing the invention. An invention that is developed through
inefficient means, involving unnecessary expense in either the
engineering studies leading to the invention or in the financing or
corporate management steps underlying those studies, is less valuable to
society than the same invention developed through more efficient
means because the net gain to society from the efficiently produced
innovation is greater.
To the extent that the backing for a line of innovation is developed
through inefficient or ineffective means, costs are injected into
technology innovation programs that could be avoided and society loses
portions of the net value of resulting innovations. Hence, the
effectiveness of corporate formation and investment generation
processes for backing innovation programs are of critical importance to
the fulfillment of patent law policies and overall social goals regarding
technological development. If these supporting corporate processes are
conducted with unnecessary costs or with less than complete backing for
available, cost-effective programs of technological development, the
types and net value of innovations that will stem from the resulting
corporate innovation efforts will not be optimal responses to public
demands for new technologies.
On the other hand, if corporate processes work effectively, they can
be a highly valuable means to match the scope of funding and available
engineering resources to the pursuit of various types of publicly valuable
innovations. By making opportunities for innovation available to small
corporation-backed innovators that work outside of large companies,
corporate funding through start-up companies allows innovation to stem
from many more sources than would be the case if only large, longstanding corporations could undertake complex, resource-intensive
innovation programs. Corporate funding at the start-up level takes the
106. Patents allow inventors to collect a “monopoly rent” from users that is equal to
the increased utility of a patented invention over non-patented substitutes. This monopoly
rent is effectively equal to the net societal gain from a patented invention as reflected in the
incremental amount that consumers will pay for access to the invention. When duplicate or
otherwise wasteful invention development efforts are undertaken in the course of producing
a patented invention, economists speak of the undesirable results as a diminishment of the
monopoly rent from the patent or “rent dissipation.” Ideally, the patent system and related
legal standards, such as corporate law provisions related to the generation of funding for
innovative programs, should be administered to minimize monopoly rent dissipation.
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blinders of large corporate thinking off of innovation decisions and adds
a wide array of independent corporate innovators led by individuals
with new innovation insights to the mix of potentially effective
innovators.
At the same time, competition for innovation-related sources of
funding ensure that there are constant pressures for innovators in startup and small companies to conduct their innovation programs in a lean,
efficiently focused manner. Investment generation forces in the area of
high-tech venture funding create a form of market discipline concerning
the scope of innovation efforts, producing pressures for effective and
efficient action by innovators in start-up companies that should
minimize innovation costs. In this respect, investors—primarily venture
capitalists in the sphere of small company-backed innovators—serve the
interests of the patent system by keeping pressures on innovators to be
effective, but efficient, in producing socially valuable (and highly
commercializable) new innovations.
B. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory offers an alternative justification for patent rights
that focuses on a later stage of innovative processes than reward theory.
Prospect theory is concerned with the efficient pursuit of practical
implementations of a newly discovered invention. The view that patent
rights may play a key role in this type of prospecting for practical
107
applications was first developed by Professor Edmund Kitch. Under
this view, the issuance of a patent is likened to the recognition of a
prospector’s claim under mining law. The holder of patent rights, like
the holder of a mining claim, is given an exclusive opportunity to search
for something valuable in the protected domain and to bring it to the
public. In the context of patented inventions, this involves the
transformation of a patented invention from an early stage, often barely
workable form, into a more useful and thoroughly understood product
108
ready for manufacturing, distribution, and public adoption.
The prospecting phase may also entail the search for additional
application settings in which a patented invention appears to have the
potential to be used in a variety of fields. For example, if a patented
invention involves a new design for a hinge that is initially used in the
automotive field, the patent holder might prospect during the life of his
107. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 272–79 (1977).
108. See id.
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or her patent for a variety of other application settings, such as the
cabinetry field, in which the new hinge arrangement would also have
particular value. The patent holder might then seek to license
manufacturers to make and to sell in the relevant settings beyond
automotive designs to ensure that the patented design was used in those
settings, albeit with corresponding license fees paid to the patent holder.
This sort of prospecting for new application fields due to the
encouragement of patent rights has the potential to bring a patented
invention into more hands than would be the case if an innovator had
no economic interest in applications beyond the area of the innovator’s
primary manufacturing and marketing capabilities and main chance to
commercialize his or her invention.
Overall, advocates of the prospecting view of patent rights feel that
the enforcement of patent rights to ensure that an exclusive opportunity
to engage in this type of product and application prospecting achieves
many of the same benefits gained by legal recognition of mining claims
in mineral prospecting settings. In the patent setting, these benefits
include avoiding the duplication of effort in prospecting for workable or
improved versions of patented inventions, maintaining substantial
incentives for investment in the development of such inventions,
reducing the need for devotion of resources to secrecy or physical
security measures for protecting the inventions, and aiding the patent
holder in maintaining control over the later use of the invention so as to
ensure that the patent holder receives rewards for successful
109
prospecting and not other imitators.
As with the initial pursuit of an invention, prospecting for useful
implementations of an already discovered invention can often be
furthered by group actions undertaken through corporate efforts. Many
of the same sorts of advantages of group processes and collective
resources already described concerning the discovery of new inventions
will generally also aid post-invention steps to produce useful product
designs incorporating the innovations and to perfect those designs.
In some contexts, there are clear reasons to expect that established
corporate organizations will be more effective and efficient in
prospecting for products following the development of a patented
innovation or the acquisition of a patent interest than individuals who
are primarily experts in the field of an invention. In a corporate setting,
particularly in a large corporation with an established product design
staff and experience with the consumer needs and interests of a given
109. Id. at 276–79.
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field, a wealth of product design expertise and experience can be
applied to a product prospecting program. A new innovation becomes a
new tool or design element that is thrown into an existing design mix, to
which product designers add a broad array of design experience. These
experienced product designers will tend to have design insights about
useful design features and be able to avoid design flaws to a greater,
faster extent than less experienced designers. The result should be
functionally better, more extensive, and faster product designs than
would be possible for an individual innovator either acting alone or with
the few additional product design specialists the individual’s resources
could bring into the process.
Preexisting corporate expertise regarding the manufacturing of
similar products may also aid product designers in large companies to
take a patented discovery and quickly transform it into products that
can be produced effectively and efficiently. Again, the preexisting
experience and expertise of persons already in a corporate organization
may allow that organization to marshal an effective manufacturing
design and implementation program for new products based on a
patented design when other parties new to the field would either design
unmanufacturable products or take far longer to work out the
manufacturing problems with new products based on patented designs.
Corporate ownership may also be an effective vehicle for combining
product design and manufacturing expertise and experience held in one
corporation with control over a patented design held in another
corporation. By establishing a joint venture to design and produce
products based on the patented design and then operating this joint
venture through a new corporation that is jointly owned by the
technology contributor and the source of product design and
manufacturing expertise, a newly-formed corporation can bring together
access to a patented design and the expertise needed to effectively
translate the design into mass-produced products that can be marketed
and delivered to the public. The shared ownership of the technology
originator and the experts in product design and marketing will ensure
that all these relevant parties will be motivated to promote their
corporation’s interests and work diligently to bring successful products
into the market. This type of new corporation achieves the same type of
linkage of product design and manufacturing expertise with rights to a
new invention that occurs in a large, established corporation when one
of its research personnel achieves a new patented invention and the
corporation’s own design staff and manufacturing specialists determine
how to implement the invention in new products and how to
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manufacture those products.
C. Disclosure Theory
Another interpretation of patent rights finds the justification for
such rights in their potential to encourage the disclosure of otherwise
secret or overlooked knowledge about patented inventions. From this
perspective, patent rights are given in exchange for disclosures of
inventions through published patent applications. Such rights are seen
as a means to ensure that discoveries of exceptional product and process
designs—that is, designs that are not merely obvious variations of prior
designs produced through incremental, everyday engineering
processes—are not lost to the public by being ignored or concealed
110
when made, but are brought to public attention.
This approach to
patent rights does not turn on how various discoveries were made, how
much effort was invested in making the discoveries, or on whether
patent incentives were needed to encourage the discoveries. Rather,
patents have merit under this theory due to the need to encourage
parties with valuable and unusual product or process designs to make
these available to the public so that the designs can be used through the
permission of the patent holders in present activities, used freely when
the patents expire, and provide the starting point for additional product
111
and process improvements.
110. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, 1 THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 2.3 (3d
ed. 2005).
[T]he grant of property rights (and thereby the creation of incentives) is
reconditioned on compliance by the patent applicant with statutory requirements
that make a public disclosure of the inventions. . . . The public record gives
information for others in their own work.
Thus, while patent laws give rights to inventors, it seeks to promote the public
disclosure of scientific and technological data. At least in theory, this perpetuates a
process of innovation among a community of scholars using shared information.
Id.
111. Assurance provided by patent rights may also encourage disclosures of
technological advances through publications outside of patents. For example, the potential
impact of software patents on voluntary disclosure practices at the AT&T Corporation was
described by one of its attorneys as follows:
One of the functions served by patents is to disclose [new technological advances] to
the public. . . . Patents themselves of course contain disclosures, but also in an
organization like mine again, we encourage publication of technical ideas, in fact last
year we published some forty-four hundred technical articles. Many of these would
not have been published if we could not also have concurrently filed patent
applications so that the publication of the technical papers would not compromise
the value of our inventions included in the disclosures.
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE
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Under this type of disclosure theory, patents are aimed at ensuring
that, as product and process designs reach new plateaus of knowledge
through leaps forward in technical understanding, these plateaus are
available to all users and designers through patent-induced design
disclosures. By creating incentives for design disclosures—and the
ultimate free availability of the disclosed designs after expiration of the
applicable patents—patent rights can overcome what might otherwise
be a preference for secret commercialization of new designs by
innovators. Patent incentives for disclosure also encourage innovators
to take a broad view of invention value, giving them reasons to pursue
and to disclose inventions outside of the fields in which the innovators
possess self-commercialization capabilities.
Disclosure incentives associated with patent rights may be
particularly important with respect to innovations made in large
corporate organizations. A large corporation that discovered a product
or process that was capable of being used in secret might have sufficient
resources—or be able to assemble such resources—to maintain the
secrecy of the advance and use it to commercial advantage without
revealing it to the world. Indeed, absent patent protection, such secrecy
would probably be a corporation’s optimal course of action because
revealing the innovation would make it available to competitors that
could use the innovation to their own competitive advantage without
bearing any of the costs of developing the innovation. Hence, patent
incentives may be particularly important in extracting commercially
valuable designs from large corporate organizations that have means of
commercially exploiting those designs in secret and that would tend to
do so were the incentives and controls of patent rights not available.
Concealment of a new advance may also seem to a company to be its
best course in the absence of patent rights when a particular advance is
more suitable for effective exploitation by the company’s competitors
than by the innovating company itself. If the innovator cannot achieve a
substantial commercial gain from a new design, but its competitors
could, the release of the design to the public would differentially favor
the competitor and the innovator would suffer both the costs of
development and whatever further costs resulted from the strengthened
competition from the second firm. However, with patent rights, a
company with an innovation is encouraged to disclose the innovation
PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS 7 (1994) (statement of
William Ryan, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. and AT&T general counsel), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf.
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even if it will aid a competitor because the competitor can be forced to
pay royalties for usage of the innovation.
Indeed, the attachment of patent rights to a new innovation can
cause a company to re-evaluate or “mine” various types of innovations
that it cannot use in its own operations, but would be valuable to other
parties. Such innovations would tend to be ignored in companies if no
patent rights or other controls over the innovations were available
because the disclosure of the innovations would produce no particular
advantage to the company that discovered the innovations. However,
with patent rights, a company is not only encouraged to disclose
innovations that are potentially valuable outside of the company’s field
but also given incentives to actively publicize and to explain the features
and availability of the new technology in ways that will bring it to the
attention of potential adopters. Patent holders are encouraged to
engage in active disclosures and publicity about patented advances
because resulting increases in the adoption of the patented inventions
will tend to expand the patent holder’s total patent royalties.
D. Rent Dissipation Theory
Rent dissipation theory adopts a somewhat different view of the
significance of patents in the period immediately after a patent issues.
Instead of being concerned with encouraging product prospecting by a
patent holder, rent dissipation theory focuses on avoiding wasteful
activities by others, thereby maximizing the incremental value (or
“monopoly rent”) that use of a patented invention is capable of bringing
112
to society. Rent dissipation occurs when some of this value is wasted
or “dissipated.” For example, rent dissipation may occur if multiple
parties compete in a redundant, wasteful fashion to solve a particular
113
technological problem.
The interpretation of patent rights as a means to avoid rent
dissipation holds that patent rights encourage disclosures of successful

112. Two leading proponents of the rent dissipation summarized this theory in regards
to patents:
Rent dissipation theory posits that society profits from innovations, often
realizing benefits far in excess of the inventor’s development costs. The difference
between what society would pay for an innovation and its actual cost of
development—the rent—is awarded to the inventor in the form of a monopoly right;
otherwise competition by imitators would discourage innovation by making it
unprofitable.
Grady & Alexander, supra note 12, at 308.
113. Id.
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inventions that help to avoid some types of post-invention rent
dissipation. Patent rights are believed to have two valuable impacts in
this regard. First, the lure of patent rights encourages intense
competition to develop initial inventions and rapid disclosure of earlystage versions of the inventions, thereby accelerating the point at which
duplicative efforts to develop the invention can be identified and will
114
tend to be stopped.
Second, patents reduce subsequent rent
dissipation by discouraging duplicate efforts to create product
115
implementations of patented inventions.
When one innovator produces a useful design and gains a related
patent, the resulting rights give that party exclusive control (during the
life of the patent) over the subsequent implementation of products and
services based on the patented design. This includes designs that extend
the patented design in some way, meaning that the patent holder has
effective control over how design improvement steps will proceed in
seeking enhancements to the patented invention.
Advocates of the rent dissipation view of patent rights argue that
patent holders will administer this product improvement process in an
efficient manner over the range of potential improvements signaled by a
patented invention. Patent holders will pursue (or encourage others to
pursue) reasonable invention improvement efforts of this sort because
patent holders stand to gain the most in net licensing revenue from such
an efficient course of subsequent product improvement. Their selfinterest will cause patent holders to tend to cut off or to avoid inefficient
rent dissipation by duplicate innovators seeking improvements in a
patented technology. Hence, patent rights are seen as having a valuable
impact in the post-patent issuance period by reducing rent dissipation
regarding the patented invention, thereby maximizing society’s net gain
116
from the invention.
However, when additional lines of improvement are not signaled by
a patented invention—that is, they are not obvious to average
practitioners in the field given knowledge of the patented invention—
patent holders will probably not administer efficient attempts at
improvement in these unforeseen additional directions. Hence, these
types of improvement efforts should probably not remain under the
control of patent holders. To achieve this, patent rights should,
according to adherents to the rent dissipation view of patents, be
114. Id. at 316–21.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 318.
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interpreted as being inapplicable to such un-signaled and unforeseeable
117
types of modifications to patented designs.
The rent dissipation reduction implications of patent rights and
disclosures may be particularly important with respect to the types of
innovations that tend to be developed in corporate settings with large
amounts of supporting resources. There are several reasons why, absent
patent incentives and disclosures, rent dissipation due to parallel
development programs may be particularly large in corporate settings.
First, the tendency of various corporations will be to conduct
research programs in secret and to maintain their results in secret forms
for as long as possible to forestall adoption of the resulting innovations
by competitors. The longer this type of secrecy extends, the more likely
it is that another company will progress down similar research paths,
setting up the type of duplicative research efforts that early disclosures
encouraged by patent rights can help to prevent.
Second, enormous resources are committed by corporations to
particular research efforts in some high-tech fields. If even a few
instances of duplicate expenditures of such large quantities of resources
can be prevented by patent rights and disclosures, a significant amount
of rent dissipation and waste to society can be avoided.
Third, by clarifying that an effort to improve particular patented
products will be under the control of the patent holder, the enforcement
of patents may strengthen investor confidence in backing efforts to
develop improvements to patented inventions. By lessening the risks
that amounts spent in developing improvements may benefit free riders
who have not borne the costs of development, patents may facilitate the
funding and efficient formation of corporate enterprises to produce
those improvements, thereby avoiding rent dissipation through
inefficient enterprise formation or under funding.
IV. REFORMING PATENT AND CORPORATE LAWS TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION IN CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS
If the collective impacts of patent and corporate laws are to
encourage effective and efficient innovation programs in corporate
settings and thereby maximize the number and value of new advances
brought to the public, several changes in present patent and corporate
laws may be desirable. This section reviews some of these potentially
desirable legal changes.

117. Id. at 319.
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The goal in this section is not to describe all of the changes in patent
and corporate law that may improve innovation in corporate settings.
The purpose here is rather just to identify a few illustrative reforms and
the reasons why they may enhance corporate innovation. Further
detailed assessments of these and other like reforms will be needed to
determine if they are desirable on balance and, if so, how they should be
implemented within existing legal structures. The aim here is to identify
a few of the key elements of present patent and corporate law standards
that merit rethinking from a corporate perspective in order to ensure
that patents and related corporate processes strongly encourage and
support innovation by corporate organizations.
A. Patent Law Reforms
1. Changing Who Receives Patents: Recognizing Corporate Inventors
and Organizational Patent Applicants
A procedural change that might both streamline the process of
obtaining corporate patents and eliminate possible inefficiencies and
uncertainties regarding the availability of patent rights for advances
developed in corporate environments or with corporate backing would
118
be to allow a corporation to apply directly for a patent related to an
118. Present patent law standards preclude corporate patent applications because a
patent application must be “made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor” of the item or
process sought to be patented. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2000). However, patent laws allow
corporations to act as agents of inventors in pursuing some patent applications that arise in
narrow circumstances. The Patent Act allows a person other than an inventor (including a
company) to pursue a patent application when the second party (1) establishes a “sufficient
proprietary interest” in the patent—perhaps through an assignment agreement covering a
transfer of the inventor’s interest in the patent to the corporation—and (2) the inventor
either cannot be found after a diligent search or refuses to sign the patent application. Id.
§ 118. In these circumstances, a patent application may be pursued by a corporation on
behalf of and as an agent for the inventor, provided that the corporation can provide proof of
the pertinent facts justifying its application on behalf of the inventor and a showing that such
an application is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. See id.
While these provisions allow for corporate-initiated patent applications in limited
circumstances, they still retain a degree of uncertainty regarding the ability of a corporation
to pursue an application. The nature of a diligent search for an absent inventor will be
somewhat unclear in a particular setting, raising questions about the adequacy of a corporate
application based on inventor absence. When an inventor is present but hesitates to sign an
application, it will be unclear as to what point this hesitation becomes a refusal to sign a
corporate application. In addition, a corporation seeking to pursue an application under the
above provisions will need to show that its action on behalf of an inventor is needed to
preserve the rights of the parties, perhaps due to a likely loss of the opportunity to obtain a
patent if there is a further delay in filing an application.
Furthermore, even when a refusal to sign is clearly present, the documentation of that

GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED

4/24/2006 6:49:31 AM

56 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1

invention made by corporate employees while working within the scope
of their employment or by other agents of a corporation when acting
119
within the scope of their agency relationships. The net effect of this
change would be to recognize that the corporation is the primary party
in interest in these situations and to grant any resulting patent directly
to the corporation.
Typically, employees working in a corporate environment are
subject to an ongoing obligation under the contractual terms of their
employment to assign any patent rights resulting from their work to
120
their corporations. Given the general enforceability of these contract
refusal may raise other questions about the validity of the patent that would result from a
corporate application. When an inventor has refused to sign an application and indicates that
he has refused because he thinks that (1) he is not the inventor of the item covered by the
application, (2) the application misstates the characteristics of the invention in some material
respect, or (3) the corporation involved is not entitled to rights in the patent at issue, these
types of documented sources of controversies may be used at a later point by potential
infringers to attack the validity of the patent that issues from a corporate application.
119. Such a change in patent laws would implement an equivalent of the “work for
hire” doctrine under copyright law. This doctrine specifies that, when a work is created by a
corporate employee while working within the scope of his or her assigned duties, the
copyright on the work is owned by the corporation involved from the outset. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2000) (providing that an employer, including a corporate employer, is deemed the
author and copyright holder of a “work for hire” created by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment and in the absence of a written agreement specifying that the
employee retains the copyright in his or her work). A corporation will also be deemed the
author of a work and entitled to the copyright in that work when the corporation specially
orders or commissions the work provided that the parties expressly agree in a signed writing
that the work will be considered a work for hire. Id. The aim of specifying the work for hire
doctrine in federal copyright statutes was, in part, to clarify the initial ownership of the
copyright resulting from a work for hire without the need for further copyright ownership
transfers from an individual author to an employer or other party commissioning works. See
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
120. See KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINESS
LAWYERS § 17.4.2 (1996) (describing the importance of such assignment agreements as basic
features of an intellectual property management program in a business environment); see also
id. at app. p, at 639 (containing an example of an agreement assigning all the rights in
inventions and works of authorship of an employee to an employer).
A contract providing for the assignment to a corporate employer of a patent not yet
issued will be strictly enforced if the patent meets contract law standards for enforceability.
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933), amended by 289
U.S. 706 (1933). In the absence of such an agreement, an employee will also be considered to
be obligated to assign a patent for an invention to his employer if the employee was “hired to
invent,” that is, when his assigned duties were to pursue new designs for practical objects or
processes. See id. However, when an invention happens to occur in the scope of an
employee’s assigned work activities but those activities do not include the pursuit of
inventions, the employee is not, in the absence of an express assignment agreement, under an
obligation to assign her employer any patent rights arising from the invention. In these
circumstances, the employer whose resources and work time were used to create the
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terms, employees assigned to work on innovation projects in corporate
settings cannot have legitimate expectations of acquiring patent rights
personally under present circumstances. Consequently, the proposed
change would not deprive many, if any, employees of patent rights that
121
they would retain under present arrangements.
These rights arising
out of innovations in corporate workplaces are almost universally
assigned to the corporations involved and exploited by the corporations,
not their employees. Similar patterns of contract provisions calling for
required assignments of patent rights to corporate principals tend to
prevail under the terms of agency arrangements outside of employment
invention may obtain a “shop-right” to use the patented invention without paying the patent
holder a royalty. See id. at 188–89. Other than this narrow shop-right, the employee will hold
all the resulting patent rights and will be able to exclude parties other than the employer from
making, using, and selling the patented invention.
The Supreme Court has described the hesitancy of federal courts to find patent
assignment obligations on the part of employees as follows:
The reluctance of courts to imply or infer an agreement by the employee to
assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of invention,
which consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, nor in fruitful research as to
the operation of natural laws, but in discovering how those laws may be utilized or
applied for some beneficial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine. It is the
result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea and its reduction to practice; the
product of original thought; a concept demonstrated to be true by practical
application or embodiment in tangible form.
Though the mental concept is embodied or realized in a mechanism or a
physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is not the invention and is not the
subject of a patent. This distinction between the idea and its application in practice
is the basis of the rule that employment merely to design or to construct or to devise
methods of manufacture is not the same as employment to invent. Recognition of
the nature of the act of invention also defines the limits of the so-called shop-right,
which shortly stated, is that where a servant, during his hours of employment,
working with his master’s materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive
right to practice the invention. This is an application of equitable principles. Since
the servant uses his master’s time, facilities, and materials to attain a concrete result,
the latter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his own property and to
duplicate it as often as he may find occasion to employ similar appliances in his
business. But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a conveyance of
the invention, which is the original conception of the employee alone, in which the
employer had no part.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. However, the proposal would alter the patterns of patent ownership regarding
inventions developed by employees working within the scope of their employment, but who
are not subject to a patent assignment agreement or who specifically hired to work on
developing inventions. Ownership of patents resulting from such inventions are presently
held by the employees. Id. The proposal would place the ownership of such patents for
inventions created in the course of employment in the hands of the corporate employer of the
inventor.
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settings, making the immediate impact of the proposal on patent
ownership by non-employee agents modest as well.
The proposed change to allow a corporate application for a patent
covering an invention made in a corporate environment has several
advantages over the presently prevailing two-step process of an
individual-initiated patent application followed by a patent ownership
assignment executed by the patent applicant in favor of his or her
corporation. By allowing a corporation to apply directly, the inattention
or resistance of an individual inventor in completing a patent
application and then a related assignment agreement will not impede or
create uncertainty about corporate ownership of a patent arising out of
an innovation program that a company has funded and supported. By
reducing the uncertainty of company managers and investors about the
ability of a company to follow through and obtain patent rights
regarding an innovation, corporate patent applications and resulting
patents issued directly to corporations should increase the value and
strength of patent incentives for innovation and the willingness of
investors to back those efforts. With the confidence that it will control
resulting patent rights without further concern over the cooperation of
particular employees in seeking those rights, a corporation might be
more certain of its ability to obtain patents and associated rewards and,
therefore, engage in greater search efforts to discover patentable
inventions.
Furthermore, the issuance of patents directly to a corporation may
avoid adverse skewing of patent-related rewards and incentives towards
those few individuals within corporate organization who fit patent law
standards for “inventors” and, consequently, whose cooperation with
the completion of patent applications and assignments is needed to
perfect corporate patent rights. Because their cooperation with the
relevant “paperwork” is particularly important to their corporations,
these individuals may reap especially high rewards from their
corporations for these ministerial tasks even though their contribution
to a patented invention is no greater than other parties. A more
rational and effective incentive scheme may entail the sharing by a
broader range of employees of patent-related rewards as granted under
an employer’s performance bonus or royalty sharing systems. A
corporation should be able to adjust these rewards to innovators or
parties supporting innovation to a pattern that the corporation’s
management feels will most effectively and efficiently promote internal
efforts to produce innovations without the skewing effect of the special
status of patent applicants within a group of corporate employees
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meaningfully contributing to a patented invention.
2. Changing What is Received: Clarifying the Scope and Value of
Patents
To the extent that perceived patent value encourages both the
organization of corporate efforts to innovate and the backing of those
efforts by investors, the more that patents have a clear, determinable
value, the more carefully and accurately corporations can match their
innovation efforts and investors can match the scope of their support
and investment backing to the probable value of resulting products to
society. Because they control the making, using, and selling of products
122
that incorporate the patented inventions, patents have a value that
depends directly on the amounts that consumers will pay for access to
products based on the patented inventions. This amount, in turn,
reflects the consumers’ perceptions of the increased value to them of the
patented invention relative to non-patented substitutes. In a sense,
patents serve as an economic surrogate for the exclusive opportunity to
market patented products. Because the prices consumers are willing to
pay for products incorporating patented inventions will roughly equal
123
the amount of increased utility that they gain from the products, the
overall economic value of the opportunity to market patented products
is a good measure of the social usefulness of those products as reflected
in consumer preferences and the prices that consumers are willing to
pay for access to the patented products.
By offering means to clarify patent enforceability, scope, and value
and by establishing means for communicating the resulting values for
various patents, the patent system can create clear signals about the
scope of utility of various patented inventions and give corporate
managers useful signals about not only how to prioritize product
122. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
123. If a product with a patented feature costs more than substitute items not subject to
patent controls, consumers will only pay an amount for the item with the patented feature up
to the increased utility they feel that they will gain from that item over the substitutes. Thus,
for example, if a new cell phone with a patented feature costs $150.00, but other cell phones
are available at $100.00, a rational consumer will only buy the phone with the patented
feature if that phone has an incremental functionality that the consumer feels is worth the
incremental cost. Because most patents cover improved designs on existing products and the
prior, unpatented versions of those products are typically still available and in competition
with the newer, patented versions, prices for patented items are typically in clear competition
with the prices for somewhat less desirable, unpatented versions of the same products.
Hence, a party offering a patented version of an earlier product must justify any price
increment involved in terms of identifiable increases in product functionality and value to the
consumer.
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development efforts when multiple choices are available, but also about
the range of expenses of development that will be cost-effective for a
particular invention. Similarly, investors presented with a range of
potential investments in innovative enterprises—or with choices
between investments in such enterprises and other investments in less
innovative enterprises involving less risky business activities—will be
able to look to the projected value of a present or anticipated patent as
an indicator of a likely rate of return from an investment in a corporate
innovator holding the patent.
Presently, there are many sources of errors in patent value estimates
that may reduce investors’ incentives to make investments in
corporations that rely on patent rights and related market exclusivity as
key features of their business plans. A thorough assessment of the
projected value of a patent requires several complex steps, including:
(1) an analysis of the meaning of the patent claims defining the scope of
the items or processes covered by the patent, (2) a comparison of the
claims with present and anticipated products or services to determine
the scope of manufacturing or sales activities potentially affected by the
patent, (3) a determination of the market for the affected products or
services, and (4) a determination of the cost or functional advantage—
and hence, the increased marketable value—of products or services
incorporating or relying on the patented invention over other
124
unpatented substitutes.
Clearly, there is some potential for
speculation and error at each of these steps.
These sorts of assessments of patent value are subject to further
uncertainty if there are reasons to expect that the patent under scrutiny
125
may be held invalid and unenforceable.
Also, a patented design or
method may unexpectedly lose its functional advantage and
corresponding value due to the later development of alternative
technologies that provide more useful or less expensive substitutes for
126
In addition, the value of an exclusive
the patented technology.
marketing opportunity that is protected by an enforceable patent is
subject to risks that a company will fail to properly follow up on the
opportunity and gain all the available profits due to errors in the

124. See Method and System for Rating Patents and Other Intangible Assets, U.S.
Patent No. 6,556,992 (filed Sept. 14, 2000) (issued Apr. 29, 2003) (describing methods of
patent valuation).
125. See, e.g., RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGYBASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30 (2003).
126. See id.
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company’s manufacturing or marketing processes.
Furthermore, the types of information needed for patent valuations,
such as costs and earnings from specific products and design
approaches, are rarely available to the public. Detailed figures on these
characteristics of business activities are typically kept confidential by
companies to avoid aiding competitors. Hence, patent valuation studies
either need to be conducted with the cooperation of the affected
companies or need to be based on estimates of many of the relevant cost
and profit figures.
Two types of changes in patent law standards might help to clarify
patent values and strengthen investors’ abilities to interpret the business
significance of patents. The first type of change involves alterations in
legal standards and procedures that will provide more information at an
earlier point to investors on the likely scope of patent protections and
the corresponding range of products and services that a given patent will
control. The second type of change involves adjustments in patent
remedy standards to specify a presumptively correct minimum amount
of damages for infringement, thereby making the value of patents in
litigation more predictable. This litigation value will define a minimum
estimated value for a patent that will apply in a “worst case” scenario
when all attempts to generate other profits from a patented invention
through product sales or patent licensing are unsuccessful and litigation
is required to gain value from patent rights.
Because uncertainty about the enforceability of a patent in
commercially significant settings will reduce the perceived value of the
patent, the accurate estimation of patent value would benefit from the
availability of any post-issuance means to clarify the enforceability of a
patent or at least to establish the absence of a risk of invalidity or
unenforceability that would otherwise raise questions about the patent’s
128
value.
For example, an enhanced reexamination procedure that gives a
patent holder an inexpensive means to clarify that a specific prior art
device or process does not provide a ground for questioning the validity
of a given patent might provide important reassurances to investors,
particularly when prior art has been discovered after the examination of
a patent and is, therefore, not within the examiner’s assessment of the

127. See id.
128. The risk of successful challenges to the validity of a patent is a major source of
uncertainty and reduced patent value. See id.
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patentability of the invention involved.
Alternatively, to gain an assessment of patent validity in these
circumstances that is not tainted by possible USPTO bias, another type
of useful proceeding might be a special form of declaratory judgment
action in which a patent holder could seek to clarify its title or control
over a set of product or process designs and associated marketing
opportunities. This sort of action would serve a purpose somewhat like
130
a “quiet title” action in real property law.
Under this procedure, a
patent holder would be able to describe a range of products anticipated
to be manufactured and marketed based on a patented design and to
seek a ruling interpreting the relevant patent and determining whether
the company holds the rights to exclude others from marketing goods
similar to the indicated products. This type of action might also allow a
patent holder to identify particular items of prior art apparently
threatening the validity of the patent in question—particularly prior art
sources not considered by the examiner who reviewed the patent—and
to request that the court find that the prior art does not render the
indicated patent invalid. Once patent scope and validity questions were
addressed in a declaratory judgment proceeding such as this, subsequent
litigants who were not parties to the declaratory judgment proceedings,
while not completely barred from raising similar questions, could be
129. For a complete description of present criteria for reexamination of issued patents
by the USPTO, see Sherry M. Knowles et al., Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the United
States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 614–25 (2004), and Frederick C. Williams,
Giving Inter Partes Patent Reexamination a Chance to Work, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 273–87
(2004).
130. A quiet title action typically entails a judicial proceeding to resolve adverse or
inconsistent claims to disputed property. See generally Del Webb Conservation Holding
Corp. v. Tolman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Nev. 1999). A leading treatise describes the
purposes behind such actions as the following:
[T]o protect an owner of legal title from being disturbed in his or her possession and
from being harassed by suits in regard to that title by persons setting up unjust and
illegal pretensions. Quiet title actions are also intended to allow holders of
equitable interests the right to remove from their way to legal title any unlawful
hindrance having the appearance of a better right.
65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 1 (2003). Statutes providing for actions to quiet title
generally permit resolution of every claim through which a plaintiff may be deprived of his or
her property or through which its value may be depreciated. Id. § 13. These threats that can
be resolved in a quiet title action include prospective activities or interests of other parties
from which the plaintiff in the quiet title action anticipates injury. See id. § 28. For example,
in Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 90 N.W. 1005 (Neb. 1902), the court
considered the future impact of an attempt to collect taxes and the possibility of an associated
lien being placed on property as a sufficient threat to be resolved through a quiet title action.
The court held that a plaintiff in such an action was only entitled to relief quieting title if the
tax in question was absolutely void. Id. at 1005.
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required to overcome the ruling in the declaratory judgment proceeding
with a particularly strong evidentiary showing.
This type of declaratory patent ruling would identify the types of
product features in the field of the proposed products that are exclusive
to the patent holder based on the patent at issue, thereby creating a
relatively certain basis for a corresponding market potential analysis.
Such a ruling would give clear backing to the business formation and
funding efforts surrounding the patent and products at issue.
Clarity as to the value of patents would be increased if legal
standards were adjusted to confirm that recoverable damages associated
with patent infringement—and, by implication, the value of the relevant
patent if its holder is pressed to the point of litigation—will generally be
no less than an amount that is at least roughly predictable at patent
issuance. For example, a presumptively correct floor on patent damages
might be set at the amount of the net profits made by infringers on sales
of an infringing product provided that the patent holder had sufficient
product manufacturing and marketing capabilities to make it reasonably
probable that the patent holder could have concluded the same sales.
This type of presumed floor on patent damages—or some other
predictable floor that was apparent early in the life of each patent—
would allow patent holders to predict the probable litigation value and
worth of a patent based on the actual or, more likely, the estimated
pricing and production practices of competitors selling infringing
products. The expected conduct of infringers can be projected from
their past sales of earlier, non-infringing products, with adjustments in
the price to reflect the greater attraction of the patented versions of the
products and further adjustments in expected profit levels to reflect
differences, if any, in the production costs of the patented and
unpatented product versions.
This patent damage estimate assumes that the patent infringers from
whom the patent holder will recover damages are reasonably competent
business persons and that their profits from sales of infringing items are
good approximations for the profits the patent holder could have gained
absent the infringement. In litigation, a patent holder should have the
option of proving even greater actual damages, based on showings of
such factors as a likelihood that the patent holder could have charged
higher prices for the patented item than were charged by the infringers
or that the patent holder would have had lower production costs and
greater profits per unit of the patented item.
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3. Changing Where Patentable Innovations are Produced: Altering
Inventorship Standards to Encourage the Formation of Innovative
Groups and Projects
Other patent law changes may cause patents to better encourage the
formation of working groups for the pursuit of innovation efforts.
Patent law standards might aid in the formation of these groups by
altering notions of who qualifies as an inventor and patent co-owner to
include all those parties whose involvement in a group project is critical
to the discovery and initial commercial development of a new
innovation. The idea behind this reform is that the coalescence of a new
joint venture between companies or a new start-up company can best be
encouraged by giving all of the essential players in these enterprises an
131
ownership interest in the resulting intellectual property. In the patent
sphere, this can be achieved by adjusting patent ownership standards to
recognize the full range of participants in group innovation as co-owners
of the patents resulting from an innovation.
To encourage group formation, inventorship standards might be
adjusted to include as inventors, or as persons sharing initial patent
ownership, all those persons who contribute skills or resources that are
material in developing the concept for a new invention or whose skills
were needed to reduce an invention to practice, not just those who
actually conceived of an invention. This change would make the
contributors of critically important skills and resources parties who are
inherently interested in the long-term usefulness of the resulting
inventions because they will share in the co-ownership of patents that

131. Of course, multiple participants in a group endeavor can agree among themselves
to contractually determined patterns of intellectual property ownership that will allocate
fractional ownership interests as the parties see fit and thereby create incentives to join
together in innovative groups to maximize the value of the intellectual property involved.
For example, parties in a company pursuing innovative product designs might agree that all
patents resulting from their efforts would be assigned to a given corporation and that the
fractional ownership interests of each of the parties would be handled through allocations of
percentages of the overall stock ownership of the company.
The difference between this presently available process, the proposed revisions to
inventorship standards, and the resulting range of initial patent ownership is that the
proposed system would start any ownership allocation transaction with a broader set of
shared interests and joint incentives for innovation. Using this set of shared interests as a
default condition or bargaining starting point may reduce transaction costs regarding the
process of achieving the parties desired ownership allocation because fewer transfers of
interest may be needed to achieve a desirable set of incentives. This allocation may also
avoid some of the effects of bargaining failures. Even if the parties were unable to bargain
effectively to reallocate their interests, the law will guarantee each participant in the joint
innovation enterprise a co-owner’s fractional share in the resulting patent interests.
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stem from the inventions. As co-owners, they will be willing to invest
their own efforts in proportion to the long-term advantages of the
resulting patented inventions.
Alternatively, a functionally similar result might be achieved under
existing inventorship standards through contracts promising participants
in innovation efforts assignments of fractional interests in resulting
patents or fractional interests in royalties resulting from those patents.
A third approach to reach a similar result would be to establish a
corporation surrounding an innovation effort, to allow the corporation
to apply directly for patents or obligate researchers to assign patents
resulting from the innovation effort to that corporation, and to give each
of the relevant participants in the innovation efforts a fractional stake in
the patent-owning corporation.
4. Changing When Patents are Available: Establishing Patent Value at
Earlier Stages of Innovation
Indications of potential commercial value can arise in the
progressive understanding of an innovation before any particular
practical application of the innovation may be apparent. In order to
ensure that an innovation at this promising stage attracts management’s
attention and the investment of resources needed for later stages of
product prospecting and development, a patent interest should be
available for an innovation at the earliest possible stages of its
development.
Several types of patent law adjustments might help to advance the
recognition of patent rights to earlier stages of the development of an
innovation. These desirable changes include shifts in utility standards to
demand only a small showing of utility of a sort indicating that an
innovation is suitable for prospecting for products and for related
corporate and investor backing. Current patent law standards preclude
a patent for a discovery until it is “refined and developed to [the] point .
. . where specific benefit [from the discovery] exists in currently
132
available form.” This compels parties developing innovations to bring
inventions to a stage of development in which they can establish the
present utility of the invention before they can obtain a patent.
However, in order to encourage early-stage backing of invention design
perfection and product implementation efforts, patent standards might
be altered to recognize sufficient utility in an invention for patenting
when the state of knowledge regarding the invention is such that there is
132. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966).
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a promising range of likely applications and investor backing of the
development of those applications is likely to be advanced by patents
governing the resulting products. Once patents are issued at this stage,
aggressive fundraising to support large-scale development efforts can
start at an earlier point than would be the case if patenting is delayed to
a later stage of invention development.
Recognition of patent interests, or at least probable patent interests,
at earlier stages of innovation development would also be furthered by
changes in patent laws to implement mechanisms for speeding the
patent application and issuance processes. Changes to speed these
processes might include new provisions for expedited patent application
filing requirements that would ease and speed the process of patent
133
filing so as to make the review and issuance of a patent more rapid,
greater use of interim reviews by patent examiners such that the likely
scope of an ultimate patent can be better predicted at the early stages of
134
patent application processing, and increased use of applicant-funded
expedited processing of patent applications, at least when such
applicant-funded procedures will not prejudice the normal handling of
applications by parties who do not have the resources to invoke these
135
special procedures.

133. For example, a patent applicant might be required—or at least given the option—
to submit complete information about the prior art searches she, or her patent searching
specialist, had conducted, along with assessments of how components of the prior art found in
these searches compare with the invention being sought to be patented. While these searches
and critiques would not be binding on a patent examiner, they might help to avoid
duplications of effort and speed during a patent examiner’s review of a patent application.
134. For example, a patent examiner might issue a preliminary “triage” assessment of
probable patentability issues identified in a quick examination of a patent application,
thereby allowing a patent applicant to respond with quick amendments to avoid issues or with
explanations of why the examiners concerns were misplaced or were not barriers to issuing a
patent. The surfacing of potential issues early in the process may allow them to be dealt with
quickly and efficiently before both the examiner’s and the applicant’s time is wasted on
unnecessary analyses and submissions.
135. This type of applicant funding of patent reviews by reliable personnel selected by
the USPTO would be a parallel to the applicant-funded procedures used in some county
planning offices to speed reviews of major building projects and accelerate the issuance of
building permits. So long as the availability of specially-funded and speeded applications
processes does not prejudice the result in favor of patent applicants with sufficient funds to
obtain expedited processing and the availability of such processing does not create greater
delays or other incremental problems for un-expedited applicants, the speed accomplished
through specially funded patent application processing will aid the public by bringing
patented inventions to public attention and availability more quickly than regular patent
processing.
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5. Changing How Patentable Innovations are Assessed: Modifying
Nonobviousness Standards to Encourage Group Innovation and the
Accumulation of Organizational Knowledge
Patent law standards that may discourage parties or organizations
with accumulated knowledge and intellectual property rights in a
particular field to form group enterprises aimed at discovering and
commercializing further innovations could be revised to better
encourage group innovation. For example, standards for identifying
relevant “prior art” for purposes of determining the novelty and
nonobviousness of new inventions should be adjusted to ensure that
patents encourage the formation of innovative groups in which the
assembly of information, expertise, and resources through group
processes are needed to bring innovations to the public. This includes
circumstances in which group processes are needed to promote the
discovery of a new invention, the development of products from an
invention, or the initiation of manufacturing and marketing of new
products based on a new invention. The range of advances that are seen
as new, nonobvious designs potentially qualifying for patents should be
adjusted to ensure that patent rights attach to innovations and
encourage group efforts when public access to the innovations will be
significantly furthered by group processes to develop related products,
manufacturing programs, and marketing efforts.
This can be
accomplished by carefully tailoring the range of prior art that is deemed
sufficient to preclude a patent for a particular invention.
Existing patent laws recognize that the accumulated knowledge
gained by a single organization which is actively developing
technological innovations in a given field should not restrict or diminish
the opportunity of the organization to gain a patent when it develops an
additional new invention. This view is implemented in the Patent Act’s
standards for determining the nonobviousness of an invention for which
136
a patent is sought.
Normally, an invention that is new and useful is

136. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id. This test is commonly and somewhat awkwardly referred to as requiring that an invention
exhibit “nonobviousness” in order to be patentable. The Supreme Court has summarized the
basic considerations in determining if an invention is nonobvious as follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
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nonetheless denied a patent when the invention is a mere obvious
variation from a useful product or services already available to the
public—that is, a mere obvious variation from the prior art of the field.
However, a special rule applies to corporations and other
organizations that develop and accumulate a substantial body of
innovations in a particular field. In such organizations, information held
by others in the organizations at the time a further advance is made is
not considered to be part of the prior art of the field for purposes of
determining the nonobviousness of the further advance. This rule is
implemented under the following statutory provision:
Subject matter developed by a person [other than the inventor],
which qualifies as prior art [due to previous invention by
another], shall not preclude patentability under [the
nonobviousness standards of the Patent Act] where the subject
matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention
was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation
137
of assignment to the same person.
Congress added this language to the patent statute specifically to avoid
the invalidation of patents on the basis of the work of fellow employees
138
engaged in team research.
This provision of patent law frequently has an impact on prior art
and nonobviousness determinations in corporate settings. For example,
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevancy.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.130 (2004) (describing required
contents of affidavit needed to disqualify prior art under § 103(c) in the context of a patent
examination or reexamination proceeding).
For purposes of applying this section of the Patent Act, “another person” has been
interpreted by courts as meaning any inventive entity that is not identical in composition
to any other inventive entity. For example, when an application for a patent is made in
the names of A and B, prior art attributable to A or to A and C is deemed to be prior art
developed by “another person.” See JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 3 PATENT
LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17:8 (2d ed. 2005).
138. See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS: PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS OF 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833 (stating
that the provisions of § 103(c) were aimed at encouraging communications among members
of research teams and at overturning earlier case law that had suggested that one team
member’s earlier invention that was not made public might be treated as prior art for
purposes of determining the novelty and nonobviousness of a later invention by a second
team member).
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in one case in which a corporation owned a patent on a fluidic nozzle
and obtained a further patent on windshield washer technology, the
corporation’s common ownership of the two patents precluded the
nozzle patent from being used as prior art for purposes of determining
whether the invention covered by the windshield washer patent was
139
obvious and unpatentable. In a typical high-tech company in which all
employees are under an obligation to assign to their company the patent
rights arising out of their work, this provision means that the prior work
of one employee for the company will not affect the patentability of the
work of a second employee even if the latter is an obvious variation of
the work of the former. Put in positive terms, a company’s own efforts
to accumulate a large body of design knowledge among its employees
does not work against a large company by lessening the scope of patent
incentives and the rewards the company enjoys in connection with a
new discovery.
However, the range of circumstances in which prior, accumulated
knowledge should be ignored in nonobviousness analyses should
probably be expanded to encourage various types of group efforts to
produce innovations and to promote the formation of the groups
needed in these efforts. One type of innovative group that probably
deserves similar prior art treatment to that currently afforded large
corporations involves participants in innovative teams from multiple
corporations, universities, or other organizations. In these settings,
when various contributors may be adding their respective knowledge
and that of their organizations to a group innovation effort, the
accumulated innovative histories and knowledge of their organizations
should not be held against them for purposes of determining the
patentability of their discoveries in a newly formed innovation team.
An additional category of group enterprises that plays a key role in
bringing new innovations to the public includes combinations of parties
that are formed after the discovery of patented inventions to engage in
further testing of the invention and to follow on efforts to
commercialize the inventions. These types of enterprises are not
specially protected by the present statutory language on the handling of
prior art in nonobviousness assessments because these enterprises and
the patent assignment arrangements they often entail do not predate the
discovery of a patented invention. Hence, the collective prior art of the
participants in these sorts of groups are not commonly owned at the
time of the inventions and will not come within the current provisions of
139. Bowles Fluidics Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 620 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 n.7 (D.D.C. 1985).
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the patent laws calling for special treatment of prior art under common
ownership.
In order to encourage a broader range of group efforts that will
enhance the availability of innovations, patent laws might specify that
prior art held by parties who, by the time of a patent application, have
established contract rights specifying that the parties will collectively be
the assignees of the patent being sought should have their prior art
excluded from consideration for purposes of determining the
nonobviousness of the invention covered by the application. This will
encourage parties holding related expertise—the sorts of parties best
suited to form group enterprises that will effectively commercialize and
deliver a new innovation to the public—to join together in joint
enterprises and to participate in these joint enterprises with diligent
product development and commercialization efforts.
This change will expand the period in which parties can establish
advantageous group enterprises to develop and commercialize
innovations in a given area. By reducing the range of prior art
potentially undercutting resulting patents, present law favors the
formation of corporate enterprises or other group financing and
ownership arrangements that are formed before the discovery of a
patentable invention. However, under the altered rule described here,
parties in a field with a substantial amount of accumulated expertise and
existing intellectual property rights would be encouraged to form joint
enterprises that follow up on the discovery of patentable inventions by
pursuing the further development of the invention into useful products
and the manufacturing and marketing start-up activities needed to bring
these products to the public.
B. Corporate Law Reforms
A variety of corporate law reforms might promote financial backing
for corporations’ innovative efforts by expanding shareholders’
understanding of the value of corporate patents and by enhancing
corporate management’s accountability to shareholders regarding the
pursuit and enforcement of corporate patents and related business risks.
This subsection briefly examines some possible corporate law changes
that would have these impacts.
1. Specifying Required Securities Disclosures
When a corporation engages in a public offering to generate
widespread investor funding for the commercialization of products that
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are asserted to be protected by patent rights, a large portion of the value
of the corporate enterprise involved will depend on the strength of the
patent rights held by the entity. Even if the products being developed
by the corporation are popular with consumers and initially generate
large volumes of product sales, whether or not the benefits of similar
sales volumes will inure to the corporation over time will depend greatly
on the scope of patent controls preventing other companies from
jumping in and sharing the profits from the popular new products.
Hence, even in the best of new product development situations, strong
patent rights surrounding successful products are often needed to
establish substantial long-term product exclusivity and corresponding
corporate value.
As they are being asked to invest in an enterprise that is relying
heavily on patent rights for its future well-being, potential investors
should have access to sufficient information to evaluate the scope and
strength of patent rights being relied on by the company involved. The
information investors can evaluate in this regard and the confidence of
investors in corporate enterprises aimed at commercializing patented
inventions will be enhanced if corporate disclosures filed in connection
with public stock offerings are required to include several types of
information bearing on the future force and effect of patent rights held
140
by the corporations making the offerings.
For example, required securities disclosures might include opinions
from qualified patent counsel regarding the validity and scope of any
patents that the company seeking funding is relying on for substantial
141
protection of its future business operations.
The required disclosures
might also include any material information held by company executives
140. Cf. ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE § 7:5 (2d
ed. 1994) (describing a rule proposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) in the early 1970s that would have obligated lead underwriters to develop and
adhere to specific written due diligence procedures for investigating a company embarking on
a public offering, including procedures for “[e]xamination of business protection devices and
related data such as trademarks, patents, copyrights and production obsolescence, among
others”).
141. Topics that are presently required to be addressed in connection with new stock
offerings by publicly traded corporations and in later ongoing disclosures by those
corporations are addressed in Regulation S-K issued by the Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). This Regulation provides detailed guidance for compliance with the
line-item disclosure that is required by the various forms and schedules that have to be filed
with the SEC under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10–249.10(b) (2004); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004) (describing disclosures required
in connection with new stock offerings of publicly traded entities).
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tending to undercut or contradict the enforceability of these patents.
These types of disclosures might be made mandatory through either
changes in securities statutes to address patent-related disclosures
generally or new regulations addressing the special disclosure problems
of high-tech start-up companies relying on patent holdings as significant
features of their business models. Alternatively, similar changes might
be implemented through judicial interpretations of existing securities
law standards requiring disclosures of material information so as to
recognize that, in the context of a company in which the business model
relies heavily on the enforceability of particular patents and in which
investors have a corresponding stake and interest in those patents,
material information that must be disclosed to investors includes patent
validity and scope evaluations held by corporate management.
2. Clarifying Fraud Standards
In the context of smaller-scale stock sales in which companies
developing innovations are not making public offerings of stock and the
formal disclosure requirements of federal securities laws do not apply,
securities fraud laws and common law fraud standards still constrain
how companies may describe patents and related business features as
142
the companies promote sales of securities.
Investor confidence in
representations about corporate business potential and the role of
patent rights in reducing corporate operating risks would be enhanced
by fraud standards that discouraged misrepresentations about patents
by requiring complete and accurate disclosures of corporate executives’
assessments regarding the validity of key corporate patents that are
touted and relied upon in a company’s business plan. The information
considered and the experts consulted by executives in reaching their
conclusions regarding patent validity and the business impact of patent
interests should be subject to similar disclosure requirements in order to
make a company’s positive statements about the importance of its
patents not misleading.
In many business settings, stock in high-tech corporate start-up
companies will be sold to venture capitalists and other early-stage
142. In general, state laws prohibit material misstatements in connection with the sale
of a security. In addition, an omission of information in connection with the sale of a security
may also be the basis of liability, but typically only when, under the circumstances, the
omission of information tends to make the provided information materially misleading. 69A
AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation–State § 187 (2003). Information will generally be
considered material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in making an investment decision.” Id. § 190.
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corporate investors based on representations regarding the scope and
importance of patent protections covering the company’s present or
projected products. Sometimes, these sorts of representations are made
in settings where corporate managers know that there are reasons to be
cautious about reliance on patent rights, yet these reasons for caution
my be omitted from the statements the managers make to potential
investors. When a corporate manager emphasizes the future business
importance of a company patent without including specific riskclarifying information the manager holds about the possible invalidity or
restricted scope of the patent, fraud laws should recognize that the
failure of the manager to be more forthcoming and balanced in this type
of representation to investors amounts to a material misstatement
regarding the future role of the patent. Put simply, presentation of a
rosy picture of patent significance in such a business context amounts to
a misrepresentation when information about the favorable impacts that
a patent is expected to have is not balanced with known information
about patent invalidity or inapplicability to the business opportunities
the corporation in question. Such a material misstatement should open
up the manager making the statement to damage liability for securities
holders’ losses when the flaws of the patents and the negative impact of
those flaws on corporate fortunes are later revealed.
Of course, corporate managers should not be obligated to make
disclosures of adverse information regarding patent enforcement in all
143
circumstances. Two types of cases should give rise to an obligation to
be complete in statements made about the corporate significance of
particular patents.
First, when managers themselves point investors to patents as key
corporate assets and sources of reduced business risk in ensuring the
exclusivity of marketing opportunities, corporate managers should have
a duty to couple their positive remarks with whatever qualifying
information that the managers have. Absent this, the unqualified
representations of the managers will tend to convey an unqualified
message regarding the strength and importance of the patents
addressed—a message that the managers involved know to be untrue.
In short, knowing overstatement of the legal and business significance of
patents is a type of material misstatement that fraud laws should

143. Under most state standards, individuals involved in selling stock do not face
liability for non-disclosure when the parties provide no information to buyers of the stock.
See, e.g., McCall v. Finley, 362 S.E.2d 26, 31 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); 69A AM. JUR. 2d Securities
Regulation–State § 187 (2003).
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recognize as a valid basis for damage claims from investors who rely on
corporate managers unqualified statements.
Second, when the nature of a company’s business would naturally
focus investors on the importance of patents in maintaining the
exclusivity of certain product production and marketing opportunities,
even general statements of corporate health and positive future
potential may need to be accompanied by patent risk information held
by executives making the statements. The combination of an assertion
of strong corporate performance or prospects without the associated
disclosure of patent enforcement concerns should be seen as a material
misstatement. These sorts of misstatements should establish a cause of
action giving investors a source of relief when they were misled by
overly favorable statements about company fortunes and the company
involved has suffered a loss due to these undisclosed risks regarding
patent enforcement.
In certain circumstances, professional duties or other fiduciary
obligations possessed by persons holding information on potential
patent invalidity or unenforceability may obligate the persons to
disclose that information even in the absence of a positive
144
representation of corporate business soundness. In these settings, the
normal rule that persons holding adverse information need not disclose
it is overcome by the professional or fiduciary duties of the parties.
When this is the case, state fiduciary standards will require that persons
make positive disclosures of material information regarding risks to the
enforceability and value of corporate patents. The failure to make such
disclosures will open the individuals involved to damage claims from
corporate shareholders and others who are adversely affected by the
ultimate unenforceability of the patents involved and the resulting drop
in corporate fortunes.
3. Corporate Governance Standards
Under present standards defining the duties of corporate officers
and directors, such individuals are obligated to periodically monitor
significant risks to corporate performance and to react when unusual
144. Cf. Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308, 309–15 (N.D. Ill. 1918) (holding that
the fiduciary obligation of the corporate director required the transfer of a patent obtained by
the director to the corporation); PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY
§ 5:4.4 (1999) (“Because of their fiduciary status, directors and officers are more vulnerable
than ordinary employees to losing ownership of their inventions. Since the fiduciary-inventor
has a special position of trust in the corporation, the courts may consider it inequitable for the
fiduciaries to own their inventions.”)
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information indicates a serious threat to future corporate well-being.
In the context of businesses that are based on the commercialization of
patented inventions and in which the unexpected unenforceability of
key patents will be a major business disaster, the duties of corporate
leaders should be interpreted to extend to the monitoring of evolving
circumstances affecting the enforceability and business value of
146
corporate patents. Diligence in these monitoring efforts by corporate
executives should aid the executives in proactively managing patentrelated risks to corporate performance. It should also reassure
shareholders that patent enforcement risks will be caught at a stage
when their adverse effects on corporate performance can be minimized.
Such monitoring by corporate executives may also detect new
information about material patent risks that will need to be passed on to
shareholders, thereby aiding their assessments of corporate
performance and potential.
This type of monitoring of patent enforceability risks is particularly
critical when business planning at the outset of a major product
development or manufacturing initiative has been premised on the
assumed enforceability of key patents and the corresponding exclusivity
of a marketing opportunity. Resources committed to such an endeavor
may be largely wasted if the patents are not enforceable and the
company involved must fight to compete with several other companies
for product sales in the same market. Such competition will typically
produce lower income for the patent holder for two reasons: (1) the
patent holder’s volume of product sales in the targeted market will go
down because sales in that market will be shared with competitors and
(2) each product unit will sell at a lower price determined by head-tohead competition rather than by the temporary marketing exclusivity
ensured by patent rights.
Failures of corporate leaders to meet monitoring and reaction duties

145. A director or officer’s failure to make reasonable inquiry into “red flags”
suggesting adverse corporate developments or a director’s inadequate monitoring of major
facets of corporate performance are independent grounds for finding a breach of the duty of
care. The receipt of information that would cause a reasonable person to suspect an adverse
corporate development may require a director or officer to make inquiries to determine if the
suspected problem is present. Even absent cause for suspicion, courts have found directors
and officers liable for inadequate monitoring of corporate affairs and inadequate oversight of
significant corporate activities. 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1034.80 (perm. ed. 2002).
146. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(holding that a corporate director breaches his or her duty of care through a sustained or
systematic failure to exercise oversight concerning major risks to corporate interests).
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under state corporation laws can lead to damage claims against these
individuals for losses suffered by their corporations when these losses
would have been likely to have been avoided through more diligent
management attention and action.
If corporate fortunes drop
precipitously following a finding that key patents are unenforceable,
corporate leaders who should have detected, through reasonable fact
147
finding, the source of unenforceability or who were aware of potential
problems with the patents but did not react by conducting a complete
study and redirecting corporate affairs to prevent wasteful reliance on a
148
flawed patent strategy will be personally liable to their corporation for
the losses that their inattention caused.
By clarifying the obligations of corporate directors and officers to
act on behalf of shareholders in the monitoring and management of
threats to patent enforceability and to provide shareholders with
information about these threats so that shareholders can take their own
protective actions, corporate duty laws are important sources of
pressure for patent management diligence on the part of corporate
leaders. These pressures not only compel corporate leaders to engage in
patent monitoring and management practices that may reduce corporate
commitments to wasteful uses of resources in pursuit of unexpectedly
non-exclusive marketing opportunities but may also increase
shareholder confidence in patent-based businesses. This last result
should ease the formation of high-tech businesses to develop products
and services based on patented inventions and increase the value of
patents themselves by making them more attractive linchpins for
business formation and financing.
4. Information Disclosure Demands from Shareholders
Existing corporate law standards require companies to respond to
shareholder demands for disclosure to the shareholders of certain
149
business records.
In the past, these sorts of disclosure requirements
147. See id.
148. Cf. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (noting that
a corporate director will face personal liability for corporate losses when the director has
“ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee
wrongdoing”).
149. Under the laws of most states, corporate shareholders are entitled to review all
the books, papers, records, federal reports, and other data of the corporation as to assets,
liabilities, contracts, operations and practices. See 5A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 145,
§ 2239.
However, the range of records that are subject to this right is generally limited to those
records that will aid shareholders in protecting their interests. See id. At least some states
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have focused primarily on corporate financial records that shareholders
needed to fully consider a matter under shareholder control. However,
the notion that shareholders are entitled to review corporate records
related to major aspects of corporate performance might be extended to
recognize corporate shareholders’ rights to compel disclosures of
opinion letters regarding patent validity or other similar records on
patent rights held by company management.
Such a right to compel disclosure of these sorts of assessments of
corporate patent rights and, by implication, to reveal associated business
risks would give shareholders meaningful information allowing them to
independently assess the possibility that key corporate patents will be
unenforceable or inapplicable to the sorts of business activities being
planned or undertaken by the shareholders’ corporations. Absent these
sorts of compelled disclosures, corporate shareholders concerned about
patent strength and related corporate business strategies must rely on
the thoroughness of patent evaluation studies initiated by corporate
managers and the willingness of the managers to accurately disclose or
describe the adverse portions of the results obtained in those studies.
Patent evaluation and disclosure processes flowing through corporate
managers who may have personal reasons to downplay or conceal
problems with patents are likely to produce inadequate information for
shareholders in many cases. Because of over-optimism born of their
enthusiasm for their business plan—or because of an outright
willingness to misrepresent the range of known risks associated with
their company’s patents—corporate leaders of high-tech businesses may
downplay or omit disclosures to shareholders of adverse patent
evaluation results.
Information disclosure rights for shareholders in small companies
that are not subject to the more formal disclosure requirements
extend the right of shareholders to inspect books and records to include inspection of
corporate contracts and other significant business papers. See, e.g., Weigel v. O’Connor, 373
N.E.2d 421, 426–28 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a corporate shareholder is legitimately
entitled to know anything and everything that the records, books and papers of a company
would show so as to protect the shareholder’s interests as long as he has an honest motive, is
not proceeding for vexatious or speculative reasons, is seeking something more than
satisfaction of his curiosity, and is not conducting a general fishing expedition).
This type of standard might support a shareholder right to inspect an opinion of counsel
regarding the enforceability and scope of a corporate patent, at least when enforcement of
the patent is a key aspect of a corporation’s business plan. See Stone v. Kellogg, 46 N.E. 222,
226 (Ill. 1896) (recognizing that the right of shareholders to review corporate records is
“founded on the principle that the shareholders have a right to be fully informed as to the
condition of the corporation, the manner in which its affairs are conducted, and how the
capital to which they have contributed is employed and managed”).
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governing pubic companies under federal securities laws would be a
valuable means to inform shareholders regarding possible threats to
their companies due to changes in expected patent enforceability or
previously unappreciated weakness in patent enforcement strategies. In
addition, the potential for compelled disclosures of adverse patent
evaluations would remind corporate managers in these settings that
maintaining patent value and accurately disclosing the strength and
business significance of corporate patents are key management
responsibilities.
Given the threat of compelled disclosures to
shareholders, corporate managers will understand that they can be held
accountable for their management of patent enforcement practices and
related business operations that rely on the force of corporate patents.
V. CONCLUSION
The efficient development and public dissemination of new and
useful innovations depends on the clarity of patent incentives and the
efficiency of corporate processes for backing innovation efforts.
Changes in both patent and corporation laws can make the formation of
collective enterprises for innovation both more likely and more
efficient. Because the public benefits from more instances of patentable
innovation and lowered financing and administrative cost in producing
these innovations, the strength of patent incentives and the success of
corporate laws supporting innovative organizations are complementary
areas of public concern.
By adjusting the sorts of legal underpinnings described in this
Article, legal reforms can shape patent interests and incentives so as to
promote the formation of group enterprises that are needed for many
complex and resource intensive forms of modern innovation and
encourage investors to back those enterprises.
This type of
encouragement and support for organizations that are capable of
modern innovation is critical in a period when highly useful
technological innovations often depend on massive commitments of
personnel and resources.
As modern society has increasingly come to depend on products and
services that can only be provided effectively through large, corporate
enterprises, the power and flexibility of corporate organizations in
financing and organizing the provision of these products and services
has taken on increased importance. The premise of this Article is that
modern innovation is more and more often a type of activity that
requires the sorts of group action, large commitments of resources, and
collective funding that can only be effectively accomplished through
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corporate organizations, and that legal infrastructures, including patent
and corporate laws, should be tailored to efficiently promote the
creation and operation of these organizations.
In this context, corporate patents—both promised patents for future
innovations and issued ones for innovations that have yet to be
transformed into publicly available products—are critically important
focal points for corporate action that can spark complex innovative
efforts, promote the formation of innovative groups to pursue these
efforts, reassure business leaders about the merit of committing large
amounts of resources to such efforts, and encourage the backing of
complex innovation efforts by a broad set of investors. As central
features of innovative organizations, corporate patents and further
corporate law standards that increase the value of patents and investor
confidence in patent interests are critical means for expanding the
activities of innovative corporate organizations and for increasing the
beneficial advances these organizations bring to the public.

